TASK-009: Mitigate SSRF vulnerability in blocklist URL validation
- Change BlocklistSourceCreate.url from str to AnyHttpUrl (Pydantic type) - Rejects non-http schemes (file://, ftp://, etc.) at model boundary - Add is_private_ip() utility to detect RFC 1918 private ranges: - 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16 (RFC 1918) - 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128 (loopback) - 169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10 (link-local) - IPv6 site-local, multicast, and reserved ranges - Add async validate_blocklist_url() function: - Resolves hostname via DNS using loop.run_in_executor() - Rejects if hostname resolves to private/reserved IP - Raises ValueError on validation failure - Integrate validation into service layer: - create_source() calls validate_blocklist_url() before persist - update_source() conditionally validates if url provided - Both raise ValueError on failure - Update router endpoints with error handling: - create_blocklist() and update_blocklist() catch ValueError - Return HTTP 400 Bad Request with descriptive error message - Add comprehensive test coverage (9 new SSRF tests): - file://, ftp://, localhost, 127.0.0.1, 192.168.x.x - 10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x, 169.254.x.x (link-local) - Valid public URLs (passes validation) - All 36 service tests passing - Update documentation: - Features.md: Document URL validation constraints - Backend-Development.md: Add SSRF prevention pattern section Fixes SSRF vulnerability where authenticated users could supply file://, ftp://, or private IP URLs and the backend would fetch them. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -311,6 +311,17 @@ Automated downloading and applying of external IP blocklists to block known mali
|
||||
- Support for plain-text lists with one IP address per line.
|
||||
- Preview the contents of a blocklist URL before enabling it (download and display a sample of entries).
|
||||
|
||||
#### URL Validation & Security
|
||||
|
||||
- **Scheme restriction:** Only `http://` and `https://` schemes are accepted. `file://`, `ftp://`, and other schemes are rejected.
|
||||
- **Hostname validation:** The hostname is resolved via DNS and the resulting IP address is validated to prevent SSRF attacks:
|
||||
- Private IP ranges (`10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`) are rejected.
|
||||
- Loopback addresses (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`) are rejected.
|
||||
- Link-local addresses (`169.254.0.0/16`, `fe80::/10`) are rejected.
|
||||
- Reserved and multicast addresses are rejected.
|
||||
- **Error handling:** If a URL fails validation (invalid scheme, unresolvable hostname, or resolves to a private IP), the API returns a `400 Bad Request` with a descriptive error message.
|
||||
- **Ports:** URLs may specify custom ports (e.g. `https://example.com:8443/list.txt`), but the hostname must still resolve to a public IP address.
|
||||
|
||||
### Schedule
|
||||
|
||||
- Configure when the blocklist import runs using a simple time-and-frequency picker (no raw cron syntax required).
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user