TASK-009: Mitigate SSRF vulnerability in blocklist URL validation

- Change BlocklistSourceCreate.url from str to AnyHttpUrl (Pydantic type)
  - Rejects non-http schemes (file://, ftp://, etc.) at model boundary

- Add is_private_ip() utility to detect RFC 1918 private ranges:
  - 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16 (RFC 1918)
  - 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128 (loopback)
  - 169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10 (link-local)
  - IPv6 site-local, multicast, and reserved ranges

- Add async validate_blocklist_url() function:
  - Resolves hostname via DNS using loop.run_in_executor()
  - Rejects if hostname resolves to private/reserved IP
  - Raises ValueError on validation failure

- Integrate validation into service layer:
  - create_source() calls validate_blocklist_url() before persist
  - update_source() conditionally validates if url provided
  - Both raise ValueError on failure

- Update router endpoints with error handling:
  - create_blocklist() and update_blocklist() catch ValueError
  - Return HTTP 400 Bad Request with descriptive error message

- Add comprehensive test coverage (9 new SSRF tests):
  - file://, ftp://, localhost, 127.0.0.1, 192.168.x.x
  - 10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x, 169.254.x.x (link-local)
  - Valid public URLs (passes validation)
  - All 36 service tests passing

- Update documentation:
  - Features.md: Document URL validation constraints
  - Backend-Development.md: Add SSRF prevention pattern section

Fixes SSRF vulnerability where authenticated users could supply
file://, ftp://, or private IP URLs and the backend would fetch them.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-04-26 12:57:23 +02:00
parent a5b55d1248
commit 4ab767e3d4
9 changed files with 291 additions and 66 deletions

View File

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ from app.models.blocklist import (
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_SETUP_PAYLOAD = {
"master_password": "testpassword1",
"master_password": "TestPassword1!",
"database_path": "bangui.db",
"fail2ban_socket": "/var/run/fail2ban/fail2ban.sock",
"timezone": "UTC",
@@ -182,8 +182,10 @@ class TestListBlocklists:
class TestCreateBlocklist:
async def test_create_returns_201(self, bl_client: AsyncClient) -> None:
@patch("app.utils.ip_utils.validate_blocklist_url")
async def test_create_returns_201(self, mock_validate: AsyncMock, bl_client: AsyncClient) -> None:
"""POST /api/blocklists creates a source and returns HTTP 201."""
mock_validate.return_value = None
with patch(
"app.routers.blocklist.blocklist_service.create_source",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=_make_source()),
@@ -194,8 +196,10 @@ class TestCreateBlocklist:
)
assert resp.status_code == 201
async def test_create_source_id_in_response(self, bl_client: AsyncClient) -> None:
@patch("app.utils.ip_utils.validate_blocklist_url")
async def test_create_source_id_in_response(self, mock_validate: AsyncMock, bl_client: AsyncClient) -> None:
"""Created source response includes the id field."""
mock_validate.return_value = None
with patch(
"app.routers.blocklist.blocklist_service.create_source",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=_make_source(42)),