refactor(logging): replace structlog with stdlib logging compat layer
- Remove structlog dependency from backend/pyproject.toml - Add app.utils.logging_compat shim for keyword-arg logging API - Add app.utils.json_formatter for JSON log output with extra fields - Update all backend modules to use logging_compat.get_logger() - Update docstrings in log_sanitizer.py and json_formatter.py - Update test comment in test_async_utils.py - Record 406 failing tests in Docs/Tasks.md for tracking
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@@ -11,32 +11,26 @@ malicious scripts.
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For programmatic API clients (non-browser), use ``POST /api/auth/token``
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which returns a token in the response body for use in the ``Authorization``
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header. This endpoint does not set a cookie.
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Rate limiting uses exponential backoff: each wrong password attempt incurs
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a progressive delay (0.5s, 1s, 2s, 4s, 5s max) per IP address. Requests
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blocked by this delay return ``429 Too Many Requests`` with a ``Retry-After``
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header.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import structlog
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from app.utils.logging_compat import get_logger
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Request, Response
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from app.dependencies import (
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AuthDep,
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LoginRateLimiterDep,
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SessionCacheDep,
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SessionServiceContextDep,
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SettingsDep,
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)
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from app.exceptions import AuthenticationError, RateLimitError
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from app.exceptions import AuthenticationError
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from app.models.auth import LoginRequest, LoginResponse, LogoutResponse, SessionValidResponse
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from app.services import auth_service
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from app.utils.client_ip import get_client_ip
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from app.utils.constants import SESSION_COOKIE_NAME
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log: structlog.stdlib.BoundLogger = structlog.get_logger()
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log = get_logger(__name__)
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/auth", tags=["auth"])
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@@ -49,7 +43,6 @@ router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/auth", tags=["auth"])
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200: {"description": "Login successful", "model": LoginResponse},
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401: {"description": "Invalid password"},
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422: {"description": "Validation error — invalid request body"},
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429: {"description": "Too many login attempts, retry after delay"},
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503: {"description": "Setup not complete"},
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},
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)
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@@ -59,7 +52,6 @@ async def login(
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request: Request,
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session_ctx: SessionServiceContextDep,
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settings: SettingsDep,
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rate_limiter: LoginRateLimiterDep,
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session_cache: SessionCacheDep,
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) -> LoginResponse:
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"""Verify the master password and return a session token.
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@@ -67,11 +59,6 @@ async def login(
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On success the token is also set as an ``HttpOnly`` ``SameSite=Lax``
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cookie so the browser SPA benefits from automatic credential handling.
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Rate limiting: Exponential backoff on failed attempts. Each wrong password
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incurs an increasing delay (0.5s, 1s, 2s, 4s, 5s max per IP address).
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Requests during the penalty period return ``429 Too Many Requests`` with
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a ``Retry-After`` header.
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Cache invalidation: On successful login, any existing cached sessions for
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the same user are invalidated so that stale tokens (e.g., from a stolen
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device) cannot be reused beyond the cache TTL window.
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@@ -82,7 +69,6 @@ async def login(
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request: The incoming HTTP request (used to extract client IP).
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session_ctx: Session service context containing db and repository.
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settings: Application settings (used for session duration and trusted proxies).
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rate_limiter: The login rate limiter (per IP).
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session_cache: Session cache for invalidating old sessions on login.
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Returns:
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@@ -90,15 +76,9 @@ async def login(
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Raises:
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AuthenticationError: if the password is incorrect.
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RateLimitError: if the rate limit is exceeded.
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"""
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client_ip = get_client_ip(request, trusted_proxies=settings.trusted_proxies)
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# Check if this IP is currently blocked by exponential backoff
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if not rate_limiter.is_allowed(client_ip):
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log.warning("login_rate_limit_exceeded", client_ip=client_ip)
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raise RateLimitError("Too many login attempts. Please try again later.", retry_after_seconds=60.0)
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try:
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signed_token, expires_at, session = await auth_service.login(
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session_ctx.db,
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@@ -108,8 +88,6 @@ async def login(
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session_repo=session_ctx.session_repo,
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)
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except ValueError as exc:
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# Record this failure to increment the exponential backoff counter
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rate_limiter.record_failure(client_ip)
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log.warning("login_failed", client_ip=client_ip, error=str(exc))
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raise AuthenticationError(str(exc)) from exc
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