Remove hidden cross-service coupling by making dependencies explicit through
dependency injection while maintaining backward compatibility via lazy imports.
Key changes:
- history_service and ban_service: Removed direct module-level imports of
fail2ban_metadata_service, added optional service parameters to functions
- Added get_fail2ban_metadata_service() provider to dependencies.py
- Updated history router to inject Fail2BanMetadataService dependency
- history_service functions now use lazy imports in fallback paths for
backward compatibility when service is not explicitly injected
- All test patches updated to use internal _get_fail2ban_db_path() helper
- jail_config_service and jail_service already follow best practices
This pattern prevents circular imports, makes services testable via explicit
mocking, and documents service dependencies clearly.
Fixes: Instructions.md #2 - Hidden cross-service coupling
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Fixes a critical security vulnerability where the session token was
being returned in the JSON response body of POST /api/auth/login.
This exposed the token to JavaScript, allowing malicious scripts to
steal it and bypass the HttpOnly cookie protection.
Changes:
- Backend: Remove 'token' field from LoginResponse model (auth.py)
- Backend: Update login() endpoint to return only 'expires_at'
- Frontend: Update LoginResponse type to exclude 'token' field
- Backend: Update test helper _login() to extract token from cookie
- Backend: Update test cases to verify token is NOT in response body
- Documentation: Add section 'Authentication Endpoints' in Backend-Development.md
- Documentation: Update Web-Development.md to explain HttpOnly cookie benefits
Security benefit: Session tokens are now only accessible via HttpOnly
cookies, protected from JavaScript access, XSS attacks, and malicious
third-party scripts. The frontend continues to use only the cookie for
authentication.
All auth tests pass (23 tests). Type checking and linting pass with
zero errors.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Add automatic cleanup of stale geolocation cache entries to prevent
unbounded database growth. Resolves the issue where unique IP addresses
accumulated indefinitely in the geo_cache table, degrading query performance.
## Changes
### Database Schema (Migration 3)
- Add 'last_seen' column to geo_cache table tracking last reference time
- Existing entries default to current timestamp
### Repository Layer (geo_cache_repo.py)
- Update upsert_entry() to set/refresh last_seen on insert/update
- Update upsert_neg_entry() to set/refresh last_seen on negative cache hits
- Update bulk_upsert_entries() to set/refresh last_seen in batch operations
- Add delete_stale_entries(db, cutoff_iso) -> int for purging old entries
### Background Task (geo_cache_cleanup.py)
- New APScheduler task that runs nightly (24-hour interval)
- Calculates cutoff as 90 days ago from current time (UTC)
- Deletes all entries with last_seen older than cutoff
- Logs operation results (info when deleted > 0, debug when 0 deleted)
- Configurable retention period via GEO_CACHE_RETENTION_DAYS constant
### Application Startup (startup.py)
- Register geo_cache_cleanup task in scheduler during app startup
- Placed after geo_cache_flush in task registration order
### Tests
- Add delete_stale_entries test cases covering:
* Removal of old entries beyond cutoff
* No deletion when all entries are recent
* Empty table edge case
- Update existing test fixtures to include last_seen column
- Add full test suite for cleanup task registration and execution
### Documentation
- Architekture.md: Document cleanup task, update schema/diagram
- Backend-Development.md: Add retention policy documentation
## Behavior
When an IP is accessed, its last_seen is refreshed. After 90 days of no
access, an IP is purged by the nightly cleanup. On next encounter, the IP
is re-resolved from MaxMind MMDB or ip-api.com (if configured).
This is acceptable because:
1. Stale geolocation data may become inaccurate over time
2. Re-resolution cost is minimal compared to unbounded storage growth
3. Active IPs maintain fresh data through their last_seen updates
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Bcrypt silently truncates passwords at 72 bytes, so passwords longer than 72
characters provide no additional security. This commit enforces the 72-byte
maximum across the authentication and setup flows.
Changes:
- Add max_length=72 to LoginRequest.password and SetupRequest.master_password
- Update field validator in SetupRequest to explicitly check max_length
- Add comprehensive tests for password length validation (6 new test cases)
- Document the 72-byte limitation in Features.md (master password options)
- Add new section 12 'Password Hashing' in Backend-Development.md explaining:
- The bcrypt truncation behavior
- Why the limit is enforced
- The validation flow from frontend to backend
- What happens when passwords exceed the limit
All existing tests pass, no regressions introduced.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Make MaxMind GeoLite2-Country MMDB the primary IP resolver (local, encrypted)
and demote ip-api.com to optional fallback only (disabled by default).
Changes:
- Add geoip_allow_http_fallback config flag (default False) to Settings
- Refactor GeoCache.lookup() and lookup_batch() to try MMDB first
- Update startup.py to pass config flag and log security warning when HTTP enabled
- Update all 49 tests to reflect new MMDB-primary strategy
- Add comprehensive geoip configuration section to Backend-Development.md
- Update Architekture.md to show MMDB + optional HTTP in system dependencies
- Update .env.example with BANGUI_GEOIP_DB_PATH and HTTP fallback flag
Security impact:
- 99% of IP addresses (successful MMDB lookups) now stay local, encrypted
- HTTP-only IPs are cached for 5 minutes to minimize external calls
- Operators must explicitly enable HTTP fallback (security-conscious default)
- GDPR/CCPA compliance: no PII sent over unencrypted networks by default
Fixes TASK-030: Resolved plaintext IP transmission to ip-api.com
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Create logged_task() helper in backend/app/utils/async_utils.py to wrap
fire-and-forget coroutines with exception logging
- Ensures unhandled task exceptions are always logged to structlog instead of
silently discarded (Python 3.11+ RuntimeWarning)
- Update ban_service.py to use logged_task() for geo_cache.lookup_batch()
background resolution
- Add comprehensive tests for logged_task() in test_async_utils.py
- Document fire-and-forget task conventions in Backend-Development.md
The logged_task() wrapper catches any exception raised in a background task,
logs it with full traceback context and task name, and never re-raises.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Addresses security concern where FastAPI's default behavior exposes interactive
API documentation (/docs, /redoc) without authentication, allowing attackers to
enumerate endpoints and understand API schemas.
Changes:
- Add BANGUI_ENABLE_DOCS boolean setting (default: false) to Settings
- Modify create_app() to conditionally set docs_url, redoc_url, openapi_url
- Add docs endpoints to SetupRedirectMiddleware allowlist (/api/docs, /api/redoc, /api/openapi.json)
- Set BANGUI_ENABLE_DOCS=true in Docker/compose.debug.yml for development
- Production compose files leave it unset (defaults to false, docs disabled)
- Add comprehensive tests for docs configuration
- Document the new setting in Backend-Development.md
Security Impact:
- API documentation is now disabled by default in production
- Development environments can enable docs by setting BANGUI_ENABLE_DOCS=true
- Docs endpoints are inaccessible in production without manual configuration
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Replace non-atomic db.executescript() with explicit transaction control.
Wrap each migration's DDL statements and schema_migrations insert in a
single BEGIN IMMEDIATE ... COMMIT transaction to ensure atomicity.
Changes:
- Add _parse_migration_statements() to split migration scripts into
individual statements while handling comments and string literals
- Update _apply_migration() to wrap all statements in a single explicit
transaction with rollback on error
- Ensure _get_current_schema_version() uses execute() instead of
executescript()
- Add 9 new tests for migration atomicity and statement parsing
- Update Backend-Development.md with migration authoring guidelines
If a crash occurs between DDL execution and schema_migrations insert,
the next startup will re-apply the entire migration atomically,
preventing partial migrations and data corruption.
Test coverage: 98% on db.py (up from 55%)
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Store session tokens as one-way SHA256 hashes instead of plaintext
- Hash tokens on write (create_session) and on read (get_session, delete_session)
- Add migration to drop plaintext sessions table and recreate with token_hash column
- Update Session model: token field still contains raw token for signing
- Add test to verify tokens are hashed in database, not plaintext
- Update Architekture.md to document session token hashing
- Update Backend-Development.md with implementation pattern and best practices
Prevents direct session token hijacking if database file is exposed to attacker.
If plaintext DB was readable, sessions are invalidated by the migration anyway.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
**Issue:**
- log_target accepted arbitrary paths, allowing authenticated users to write
files as root via fail2ban (e.g., /etc/cron.d/bangui-pwned)
- fail2ban runs as root and opens files specified in log_target
**Solution:**
1. **Model layer validation:** Already existed in GlobalConfigUpdate, prevents
invalid paths before reaching service
2. **Service layer validation:** Added defensive check in update_global_config()
that validates log_target even if model validation is bypassed
3. **New validation helper:** Added validate_log_target() utility that accepts
special values (STDOUT, STDERR, SYSLOG) or paths within allowed directories
**Changes:**
- app/utils/path_utils.py: Added validate_log_target() helper
- app/services/config_service.py: Added service-layer validation before
sending command to fail2ban
- backend/tests: Fixed session_secret length issues in fixtures (min 32 chars)
- backend/tests: Added tests for valid special log targets
- Docs/Backend-Development.md: Documented log_target security requirements
**Test Coverage:**
- Model validation rejects /etc/passwd (existing test)
- Model validation accepts STDOUT, STDERR, SYSLOG special values
- Model validation accepts paths in allowed directories
- Service layer validation tested with special values
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Updated config.py to support environment-based configuration
- Added test_config.py with full test coverage
- Updated Backend-Development.md with configuration documentation
- Removed outdated tasks from Tasks.md
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add escape_like() helper to escape % and _ wildcards in LIKE queries
- Update fail2ban_db_repo.get_history_page() to use escaping
- Update history_archive_repo.get_archived_history() to use escaping
- Add ESCAPE clause to all LIKE queries
- Add comprehensive unit tests for escape_like function
- Add integration tests for LIKE wildcard handling
- Document LIKE escaping best practices in Backend-Development.md
Fixes TASK-017: Prevent unintended LIKE matches when IP filter contains
special characters like underscore or percent sign.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Extract path validation logic into shared helper function in
backend/app/utils/path_utils.py (validate_log_path)
- Refactor AddLogPathRequest to use the helper function
- Apply the same validation to DELETE /api/config/jails/{name}/logpath
endpoint by validating the log_path query parameter
- Return HTTP 422 with descriptive error if validation fails
- Add comprehensive unit tests for path validation
- Update Backend-Development.md with usage examples
This prevents path-traversal attacks on the delete_log_path endpoint
by ensuring all log paths are within allowlisted directories.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add LogLevel Literal type: CRITICAL, ERROR, WARNING, NOTICE, INFO, DEBUG
- Add log_target validation to accept special values (STDOUT, STDERR, SYSLOG)
or validated file paths within allowed directories
- Update GlobalConfigResponse to use LogLevel type
- Add field_validator for log_target in both GlobalConfigUpdate and
GlobalConfigResponse following the same pattern as AddLogPathRequest
- Add @autouse fixture to test_config_service.py to mock get_settings
- Update existing tests to use uppercase log level values
- Add 12 comprehensive tests for new validation in test_models.py
- Update Features.md to document valid log_target and log_level values
- Add section to Backend-Development.md documenting Literal types and
field_validator patterns with examples
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Restrict monitored log paths to a configurable allowlist of safe directories
to prevent authenticated users from instructing fail2ban to monitor arbitrary
files on the system, which could leak contents via fail2ban logging.
Changes:
- Add 'allowed_log_dirs' setting to Settings (defaults to /var/log, /config/log)
- Add @field_validator to AddLogPathRequest to validate log paths at request time
- Validator resolves paths to canonical form and checks against allowed prefixes
- Use Path.is_relative_to() to prevent prefix bypass attacks like /var/log_evil
- Add comprehensive tests for valid/invalid paths and symlink handling
- Update Features.md and Backend-Development.md with security documentation
Security improvements:
- Blocks access to sensitive files (/etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, etc.)
- Resolves symlinks before validation to prevent escape routes
- Uses proper path comparison instead of string prefix matching
- Configurable via BANGUI_ALLOWED_LOG_DIRS environment variable
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add @field_validator for fail2ban_start_command to validate with shlex.split()
at startup, catching misconfigured commands with mismatched quotes
- Replace .split() with shlex.split() in jail_config.py line 450
- Replace .split() with shlex.split() in config_misc.py line 154
- Update Backend-Development.md with configuration documentation explaining
quoted path handling and common pitfalls
- Add comprehensive test suite (8 tests) covering valid commands, quoted paths,
and mismatched quote errors
This fix ensures commands like '/opt/my tools/fail2ban-client' start are
correctly parsed as two tokens instead of three, preventing execution failures
when the path contains spaces.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add in-memory rate limiter with per-IP deque tracking of attempt timestamps
- Limit login attempts to 5 per 60 seconds per IP, return 429 on excess
- Add Retry-After header to rate limit responses
- Implement IP extraction utility with proxy trust validation (prevent X-Forwarded-For spoofing)
- Integrate rate limiter into auth router and dependencies
- Add 10-second asyncio.sleep on failed login attempts to further slow brute-force
- Add comprehensive tests for rate limiting (9 new tests, all passing)
- Update Features.md to document login rate limiting
- Update Backend-Development.md with rate limiting conventions and design patterns
- Fix test infrastructure issues: update password to meet complexity requirements
- Fix TestValidateSession tests to use Bearer token authentication
- All tests passing: 23 auth tests + full test suite coverage
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Validates session on app mount by calling GET /api/auth/session instead of relying
solely on cached sessionStorage. This ensures the UI state always reflects server
reality — expired or revoked sessions are detected immediately.
Changes:
- Backend: Add GET /api/auth/session endpoint (requires valid session, returns 200/401)
- Frontend: Add useSessionValidation hook for mount-time validation
- Frontend: Add SessionValidationLoading component for validation spinner
- Frontend: Update AuthProvider to call validation on mount with loading state
- Frontend: Add validateSession API function
- Docs: Update Features.md with session validation behavior
- Docs: Update Web-Development.md with session validation pattern
Handles three outcomes:
1. Valid session (200): Proceed with cached state
2. Invalid session (401): Clear sessionStorage and redirect to login
3. Network error: Don't logout (backend may be temporarily unreachable)
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add _check_single_worker_mode() to startup.py that detects and rejects
multi-worker configurations, raising a clear RuntimeError with instructions
- Set BANGUI_WORKERS=1 as default in Dockerfile.backend
- Document single-worker requirement in compose.prod.yml
- Add 'Deployment Constraints' section to Architekture.md explaining why
single-worker mode is required and detailing future multi-worker support
- Add '9.1 Background Tasks and Scheduler Architecture' section to
Backend-Development.md documenting task structure and single-worker requirement
- Add comprehensive test suite (test_startup.py) covering all scenarios:
allows single worker, rejects multi-worker, validates config format,
and verifies informative error messages
This fix addresses TASK-002 which identified that in-process APScheduler is
unsafe in multi-worker deployments due to each worker creating independent
scheduler instances, causing duplicate background job execution.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Consolidate the two divergent implementations of _since_unix from ban_service.py
and history_service.py into a single shared utility function in time_utils.py.
Changes:
- Move _since_unix to app/utils/time_utils.py with consistent time.time() approach
- Move TIME_RANGE_SLACK_SECONDS constant to app/utils/constants.py
- Update ban_service.py to import since_unix from time_utils
- Update history_service.py to import since_unix from time_utils
- Both services now use the same window boundary calculation with 60-second slack
- Add comprehensive tests for the shared since_unix function
- Document timestamp handling rationale in Backend-Development.md
This ensures dashboard and history queries return consistent row counts for the
same time range by using the same timestamp calculation and slack window across
all services.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Refactor action_config_service, filter_config_service, jail_config_service, and jail_service
- Add jail_socket utility module for socket communication
- Update test_jail_service with new test cases
- Update architecture and task documentation
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Create GeoCache class with all mutable state as instance attributes:
- _cache, _neg_cache, _dirty, _geoip_reader, _geoip_initialized, _cache_lock
- All public methods: lookup(), lookup_batch(), lookup_cached_only(), flush_dirty(), load_from_db(), clear(), etc.
Initialization & Dependency Injection:
- Instantiate GeoCache in startup.py and store on app.state.geo_cache
- Add get_geo_cache() dependency function in dependencies.py
- Inject into routes and tasks via FastAPI's dependency system
Backward Compatibility:
- Maintain module-level functions in geo_service.py as deprecated wrappers
- All old callers continue to work through _default_geo_cache instance
- Remove test-escape-hatch functions (clear_cache, clear_neg_cache moved to methods)
Background Tasks:
- Update geo_cache_flush.py and geo_re_resolve.py to receive GeoCache instance
- Tasks now operate on injected instance rather than module globals
Tests:
- Refactor test_geo_service.py with geo_cache fixture providing fresh instances
- Update patch paths to target GeoCache methods correctly
- Fix internal state assertions to access instance attributes
Documentation:
- Update Architekture.md to document GeoCache as managed stateful service
- Describe cache lifecycle (load on startup, flush periodically, re-resolve stale)
- Note process-local limitations for multi-worker deployments
Fixes violation of Single Responsibility Principle: module no longer owns both
lookup logic and cache lifecycle management. Cache is now a first-class
injectable service with transparent lifecycle.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Move ConfigDirError, ConfigFileNotFoundError, ConfigFileExistsError, ConfigFileWriteError, and ConfigFileNameError from raw_config_io_service into the shared domain exception module. Update router and tests to import the exceptions from app.exceptions.
