Stale sessions from a stolen device could be reused up to the cache
TTL after a legitimate user re-logs in, because login never cleared
the existing cache entry.
Changes:
- Add invalidate_by_user(user_id) to SessionCache protocol
- InMemorySessionCache maintains a user_id -> set[token] index to
support O(1) invalidation of all sessions for a given user
- NoOpSessionCache stub updated for API compatibility
- auth_service.login() now returns the Session object alongside
signed_token and expires_at
- login router calls session_cache.invalidate_by_user(session.id)
immediately after successful authentication
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds support for gradual session secret rotation without forcing logout:
- Add BANGUI_SESSION_SECRET_PREVIOUS config field for rotation window
- Implement unwrap_session_token_with_rotation() to accept tokens signed with
either current or previous secret
- Update validate_session() to transparently accept old tokens during rotation
- Update logout() to accept tokens from both secrets
- Add comprehensive logging for rotation events and metrics
- Add 8 new tests covering all rotation scenarios
- Update documentation with step-by-step rotation strategy
- Update .env.example with previous secret field
Key features:
- No forced logout: old tokens continue working during rotation window
- Transparent validation: old tokens are automatically logged for monitoring
- Production-safe: can rotate secrets without service interruption
- Metrics-ready: logs track token rotation for observability
Rotation workflow:
1. Generate new secret and set BANGUI_SESSION_SECRET
2. Set BANGUI_SESSION_SECRET_PREVIOUS to old secret
3. Wait for old tokens to expire (≥ session_duration_minutes)
4. Unset BANGUI_SESSION_SECRET_PREVIOUS to complete rotation
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Remove the early-return branch that skipped HMAC verification for unsigned tokens
- Raise ValueError if the signature separator is absent
- Update unwrap_session_token docstring to reflect mandatory signing requirement
- Add comprehensive session token signing documentation to Backend-Development.md
- Document the session token format, signing/verification pattern, and security rationale
All tokens must now carry a valid HMAC-SHA256 signature. Tokens without a
signature are rejected immediately. This removes the vulnerability where an
attacker with database access could bypass the HMAC layer by using raw tokens.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Replace sensitive token fragments in structured logs with:
- login(): Use session_id=session.id (database row ID) instead of token_prefix
- logout(): Use token_hash (SHA256 one-way hash, first 12 chars) instead of token_prefix
This prevents partial token material leakage into log aggregation systems while
maintaining useful session correlation via hashed tokens or database IDs.
Also updated Backend-Development.md to clarify logging conventions for
sensitive data handling.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add SetupGuard component: redirects to /setup if setup not complete,
shown as spinner while loading. All routes except /setup now wrapped.
- SetupPage redirects to /login on mount when setup already done.
- Fix async blocking: offload bcrypt.hashpw and bcrypt.checkpw to
run_in_executor so they never stall the asyncio event loop.
- Hash password with SHA-256 (SubtleCrypto) before transmission; added
src/utils/crypto.ts with sha256Hex(). Backend stores bcrypt(sha256).
- Add Makefile with make up/down/restart/logs/clean targets.
- Add tests: _check_password async, concurrent bcrypt, expired session,
login-without-setup, run_setup event-loop interleaving.
- Update Architekture.md and Features.md to reflect all changes.
