- Store session tokens as one-way SHA256 hashes instead of plaintext
- Hash tokens on write (create_session) and on read (get_session, delete_session)
- Add migration to drop plaintext sessions table and recreate with token_hash column
- Update Session model: token field still contains raw token for signing
- Add test to verify tokens are hashed in database, not plaintext
- Update Architekture.md to document session token hashing
- Update Backend-Development.md with implementation pattern and best practices
Prevents direct session token hijacking if database file is exposed to attacker.
If plaintext DB was readable, sessions are invalidated by the migration anyway.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
**Issue:**
- log_target accepted arbitrary paths, allowing authenticated users to write
files as root via fail2ban (e.g., /etc/cron.d/bangui-pwned)
- fail2ban runs as root and opens files specified in log_target
**Solution:**
1. **Model layer validation:** Already existed in GlobalConfigUpdate, prevents
invalid paths before reaching service
2. **Service layer validation:** Added defensive check in update_global_config()
that validates log_target even if model validation is bypassed
3. **New validation helper:** Added validate_log_target() utility that accepts
special values (STDOUT, STDERR, SYSLOG) or paths within allowed directories
**Changes:**
- app/utils/path_utils.py: Added validate_log_target() helper
- app/services/config_service.py: Added service-layer validation before
sending command to fail2ban
- backend/tests: Fixed session_secret length issues in fixtures (min 32 chars)
- backend/tests: Added tests for valid special log targets
- Docs/Backend-Development.md: Documented log_target security requirements
**Test Coverage:**
- Model validation rejects /etc/passwd (existing test)
- Model validation accepts STDOUT, STDERR, SYSLOG special values
- Model validation accepts paths in allowed directories
- Service layer validation tested with special values
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Updated config.py to support environment-based configuration
- Added test_config.py with full test coverage
- Updated Backend-Development.md with configuration documentation
- Removed outdated tasks from Tasks.md
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Replace Path.write_text() with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile + os.replace()
in _write_conf_file() and _create_conf_file()
- Ensures atomic operations on same filesystem (temp file in target.parent)
- Prevents config corruption if process is killed mid-write
- Follows existing pattern in jail_config_service.py
- Add proper cleanup of temp files on error with contextlib.suppress()
- Document atomic file write conventions in Backend-Development.md
This prevents fail2ban config files (especially jail.d/*.conf) from being
left in a truncated or corrupt state, which could disable active protection.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add escape_like() helper to escape % and _ wildcards in LIKE queries
- Update fail2ban_db_repo.get_history_page() to use escaping
- Update history_archive_repo.get_archived_history() to use escaping
- Add ESCAPE clause to all LIKE queries
- Add comprehensive unit tests for escape_like function
- Add integration tests for LIKE wildcard handling
- Document LIKE escaping best practices in Backend-Development.md
Fixes TASK-017: Prevent unintended LIKE matches when IP filter contains
special characters like underscore or percent sign.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Extract path validation logic into shared helper function in
backend/app/utils/path_utils.py (validate_log_path)
- Refactor AddLogPathRequest to use the helper function
- Apply the same validation to DELETE /api/config/jails/{name}/logpath
endpoint by validating the log_path query parameter
- Return HTTP 422 with descriptive error if validation fails
- Add comprehensive unit tests for path validation
- Update Backend-Development.md with usage examples
This prevents path-traversal attacks on the delete_log_path endpoint
by ensuring all log paths are within allowlisted directories.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add LogLevel Literal type: CRITICAL, ERROR, WARNING, NOTICE, INFO, DEBUG
- Add log_target validation to accept special values (STDOUT, STDERR, SYSLOG)
or validated file paths within allowed directories
- Update GlobalConfigResponse to use LogLevel type
- Add field_validator for log_target in both GlobalConfigUpdate and
GlobalConfigResponse following the same pattern as AddLogPathRequest
- Add @autouse fixture to test_config_service.py to mock get_settings
- Update existing tests to use uppercase log level values
- Add 12 comprehensive tests for new validation in test_models.py
- Update Features.md to document valid log_target and log_level values
- Add section to Backend-Development.md documenting Literal types and
field_validator patterns with examples
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Restrict monitored log paths to a configurable allowlist of safe directories
to prevent authenticated users from instructing fail2ban to monitor arbitrary
files on the system, which could leak contents via fail2ban logging.
Changes:
- Add 'allowed_log_dirs' setting to Settings (defaults to /var/log, /config/log)
- Add @field_validator to AddLogPathRequest to validate log paths at request time
- Validator resolves paths to canonical form and checks against allowed prefixes
- Use Path.is_relative_to() to prevent prefix bypass attacks like /var/log_evil
- Add comprehensive tests for valid/invalid paths and symlink handling
- Update Features.md and Backend-Development.md with security documentation
Security improvements:
- Blocks access to sensitive files (/etc/shadow, /etc/passwd, etc.)
- Resolves symlinks before validation to prevent escape routes
- Uses proper path comparison instead of string prefix matching
- Configurable via BANGUI_ALLOWED_LOG_DIRS environment variable
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Replace sensitive token fragments in structured logs with:
- login(): Use session_id=session.id (database row ID) instead of token_prefix
- logout(): Use token_hash (SHA256 one-way hash, first 12 chars) instead of token_prefix
This prevents partial token material leakage into log aggregation systems while
maintaining useful session correlation via hashed tokens or database IDs.
Also updated Backend-Development.md to clarify logging conventions for
sensitive data handling.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add @field_validator for fail2ban_start_command to validate with shlex.split()
at startup, catching misconfigured commands with mismatched quotes
- Replace .split() with shlex.split() in jail_config.py line 450
- Replace .split() with shlex.split() in config_misc.py line 154
- Update Backend-Development.md with configuration documentation explaining
quoted path handling and common pitfalls
- Add comprehensive test suite (8 tests) covering valid commands, quoted paths,
and mismatched quote errors
This fix ensures commands like '/opt/my tools/fail2ban-client' start are
correctly parsed as two tokens instead of three, preventing execution failures
when the path contains spaces.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add in-memory rate limiter with per-IP deque tracking of attempt timestamps
- Limit login attempts to 5 per 60 seconds per IP, return 429 on excess
- Add Retry-After header to rate limit responses
- Implement IP extraction utility with proxy trust validation (prevent X-Forwarded-For spoofing)
- Integrate rate limiter into auth router and dependencies
- Add 10-second asyncio.sleep on failed login attempts to further slow brute-force
- Add comprehensive tests for rate limiting (9 new tests, all passing)
- Update Features.md to document login rate limiting
- Update Backend-Development.md with rate limiting conventions and design patterns
- Fix test infrastructure issues: update password to meet complexity requirements
- Fix TestValidateSession tests to use Bearer token authentication
- All tests passing: 23 auth tests + full test suite coverage
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add comprehensive docstring to runtime_state.py explaining single-process
constraint, impacts in multi-worker deployments, and solution approach
- Add comprehensive docstring to session_cache.py explaining process-local
cache limitation, security implications, and Redis/database alternatives
- Update Architecture.md to clarify session cache is process-local and
describe single-worker enforcement via TASK-002
- Update Architecture.md runtime state section with detailed explanation of
per-process state and multi-worker impacts
- Add Backend-Development.md section 13.7.2 documenting session cache
pluggability pattern with example Redis implementation
- All tests pass; linting passes; type checking has pre-existing errors
This is the short-term fix for TASK-003: enforce single-worker deployment
(TASK-002) and document the constraint clearly. The long-term fix (Redis
backend) is deferred as a follow-up.
- Add _check_single_worker_mode() to startup.py that detects and rejects
multi-worker configurations, raising a clear RuntimeError with instructions
- Set BANGUI_WORKERS=1 as default in Dockerfile.backend
- Document single-worker requirement in compose.prod.yml
- Add 'Deployment Constraints' section to Architekture.md explaining why
single-worker mode is required and detailing future multi-worker support
- Add '9.1 Background Tasks and Scheduler Architecture' section to
Backend-Development.md documenting task structure and single-worker requirement
- Add comprehensive test suite (test_startup.py) covering all scenarios:
allows single worker, rejects multi-worker, validates config format,
and verifies informative error messages
This fix addresses TASK-002 which identified that in-process APScheduler is
unsafe in multi-worker deployments due to each worker creating independent
scheduler instances, causing duplicate background job execution.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Problem: Repository modules use structural typing to satisfy Protocol interfaces via
cast(). A function rename, parameter change, or signature mismatch would silently pass
mypy but fail at runtime.
Solution (Option B — minimal):
1. Aligned Protocol signatures in protocols.py with actual implementations:
- BlocklistRepository: dict[str, object] → dict[str, Any] (matches implementation)
- ImportLogRepository: dict[str, object] → ImportLogRow (typed model)
- GeoCacheRepository: dict[str, object] → GeoCacheRow; Iterable → Sequence
- HistoryArchiveRepository: dict[str, object] → dict[str, Any]
- ImportLogRepository: async compute_total_pages → sync (matches implementation)
2. Created CI validation script (backend/scripts/validate_repository_protocols.py)
that runs at build time to ensure all repository modules satisfy their Protocol
interfaces. Exit 0 if valid, 1 if any mismatch. Detects:
- Missing functions
- Parameter count mismatches
- Type annotation mismatches
- Return type mismatches
3. Updated backend/app/dependencies.py with explicit docstrings linking each
get_*_repo() provider to Backend-Development.md § 13.7.1, explaining the
module-as-Protocol pattern and that it is intentional and validated.
4. Documented the pattern in Backend-Development.md § 13.7.1:
'Repository Module Pattern — Module-as-Protocol Structural Compatibility'
explaining why the pattern works, risks (silent breakage), and how the
validation mitigates it.
5. Fixed type annotation in history_archive_repo.py:
- get_all_archived_history returns list[dict] → list[dict[str, Any]]
- Imported Any type
Benefits:
- Prevents silent breakage of repository interfaces
- Formalizes the module-as-Protocol pattern as intentional
- CI validation prevents regressions without refactoring cost
- All repository tests pass (53/53)
- mypy --strict passes on modified files
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Consolidate the two divergent implementations of _since_unix from ban_service.py
and history_service.py into a single shared utility function in time_utils.py.
Changes:
- Move _since_unix to app/utils/time_utils.py with consistent time.time() approach
- Move TIME_RANGE_SLACK_SECONDS constant to app/utils/constants.py
- Update ban_service.py to import since_unix from time_utils
- Update history_service.py to import since_unix from time_utils
- Both services now use the same window boundary calculation with 60-second slack
- Add comprehensive tests for the shared since_unix function
- Document timestamp handling rationale in Backend-Development.md
This ensures dashboard and history queries return consistent row counts for the
same time range by using the same timestamp calculation and slack window across
all services.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Consolidate duplicate _ok(), _to_dict(), ensure_list(), and is_not_found_error()
functions from 6 service modules into a single canonical implementation at
backend/app/utils/fail2ban_response.py.
Changes:
- Create fail2ban_response.py with canonical implementations
- Remove local duplicates from: ban_service, jail_service, config_service,
health_service, server_service, config_file_utils
- Update all imports to use shared module
- Add comprehensive docstrings and examples
- Update Architecture.md and Backend-Development.md documentation
Benefits:
- Single source of truth for response parsing logic
- Eliminates code duplication across service layer
- Improves maintainability and consistency
- Enables centralized bug fixes and improvements
Tests: All 228 service tests passing, no regressions
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Cache setup_completed flag in app.state._setup_complete_cached after
first successful is_setup_complete() call; all subsequent API requests
skip the DB query entirely (one-way transition, cleared on restart).
- Add in-memory session token TTL cache (10 s) in require_auth; the second
request with the same token within the window skips session_repo.get_session.
- Call invalidate_session_cache() on logout so revoked tokens are evicted
immediately rather than waiting for TTL expiry.
- Add clear_session_cache() for test isolation.
- 5 new tests covering the cached fast-path for both optimisations.
- 460 tests pass, 83% coverage, zero ruff/mypy warnings.
