Fixes a critical security vulnerability where the session token was
being returned in the JSON response body of POST /api/auth/login.
This exposed the token to JavaScript, allowing malicious scripts to
steal it and bypass the HttpOnly cookie protection.
Changes:
- Backend: Remove 'token' field from LoginResponse model (auth.py)
- Backend: Update login() endpoint to return only 'expires_at'
- Frontend: Update LoginResponse type to exclude 'token' field
- Backend: Update test helper _login() to extract token from cookie
- Backend: Update test cases to verify token is NOT in response body
- Documentation: Add section 'Authentication Endpoints' in Backend-Development.md
- Documentation: Update Web-Development.md to explain HttpOnly cookie benefits
Security benefit: Session tokens are now only accessible via HttpOnly
cookies, protected from JavaScript access, XSS attacks, and malicious
third-party scripts. The frontend continues to use only the cookie for
authentication.
All auth tests pass (23 tests). Type checking and linting pass with
zero errors.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add in-memory rate limiter with per-IP deque tracking of attempt timestamps
- Limit login attempts to 5 per 60 seconds per IP, return 429 on excess
- Add Retry-After header to rate limit responses
- Implement IP extraction utility with proxy trust validation (prevent X-Forwarded-For spoofing)
- Integrate rate limiter into auth router and dependencies
- Add 10-second asyncio.sleep on failed login attempts to further slow brute-force
- Add comprehensive tests for rate limiting (9 new tests, all passing)
- Update Features.md to document login rate limiting
- Update Backend-Development.md with rate limiting conventions and design patterns
- Fix test infrastructure issues: update password to meet complexity requirements
- Fix TestValidateSession tests to use Bearer token authentication
- All tests passing: 23 auth tests + full test suite coverage
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Validates session on app mount by calling GET /api/auth/session instead of relying
solely on cached sessionStorage. This ensures the UI state always reflects server
reality — expired or revoked sessions are detected immediately.
Changes:
- Backend: Add GET /api/auth/session endpoint (requires valid session, returns 200/401)
- Frontend: Add useSessionValidation hook for mount-time validation
- Frontend: Add SessionValidationLoading component for validation spinner
- Frontend: Update AuthProvider to call validation on mount with loading state
- Frontend: Add validateSession API function
- Docs: Update Features.md with session validation behavior
- Docs: Update Web-Development.md with session validation pattern
Handles three outcomes:
1. Valid session (200): Proceed with cached state
2. Invalid session (401): Clear sessionStorage and redirect to login
3. Network error: Don't logout (backend may be temporarily unreachable)
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Cache setup_completed flag in app.state._setup_complete_cached after
first successful is_setup_complete() call; all subsequent API requests
skip the DB query entirely (one-way transition, cleared on restart).
- Add in-memory session token TTL cache (10 s) in require_auth; the second
request with the same token within the window skips session_repo.get_session.
- Call invalidate_session_cache() on logout so revoked tokens are evicted
immediately rather than waiting for TTL expiry.
- Add clear_session_cache() for test isolation.
- 5 new tests covering the cached fast-path for both optimisations.
- 460 tests pass, 83% coverage, zero ruff/mypy warnings.
