Docs/Backend-Development.md

@@ -2224,6 +2224,43 @@ The login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) is protected against brute-force att
 - Dependency: `LoginRateLimiterDep` in `app.dependencies`
 
 
+### Global Rate Limiting
+
+In addition to login-specific rate limiting, all API endpoints are protected by global per-IP rate limiting to prevent resource exhaustion, CPU spikes, and network bandwidth attacks from malicious or misconfigured clients.
+
+**Design:**
+- Uses a `dict[str, deque[float]]` keyed by client IP, storing request timestamps within a time window.
+- Implements a sliding-window algorithm: when an IP exceeds the limit, subsequent requests are blocked until the oldest request timestamp in the window expires.
+- Applied globally via middleware that runs on every request.
+- Respects the same IP extraction logic (trusted proxies) as login rate limiting.
+
+**Rate Limit Rules:**
+- **Default limit:** 200 requests per 60 seconds per IP.
+- Blocked requests return **HTTP 429 Too Many Requests** with a `Retry-After` header indicating the estimated seconds until the IP can retry.
+- The `Retry-After` value is dynamically calculated based on when the oldest request in the window will expire.
+- Different endpoints can be configured with different limits by adjusting the global rate limiter settings or using per-endpoint decorators (future enhancement).
+
+**IP Extraction (Proxy Safety):**
+- Same as login rate limiting: reads real client IP from `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers when the immediate connection is from a trusted proxy.
+- Falls back to direct connection IP when headers cannot be trusted.
+
+**Process-Local Limitation:**
+- The global rate limiter is process-local (in-memory), like the login rate limiter.
+- In single-worker deployments (enforced elsewhere), this is not a constraint.
+- Each worker in a multi-worker setup maintains independent counters, which is acceptable under the single-worker enforcement model.
+
+**Memory Management:**
+- Old request timestamps outside the rate-limit window are automatically pruned during validation checks.
+- A scheduled background task (`rate_limiter_cleanup` in `app.tasks.rate_limiter_cleanup`) runs every 30 minutes to remove dormant IPs from memory, preventing unbounded growth.
+
+**Implementation:**
+- Rate limiter: `app.utils.rate_limiter.GlobalRateLimiter`
+- Middleware: `app.middleware.rate_limit.RateLimitMiddleware`
+- IP extraction: `app.utils.client_ip.get_client_ip()`
+- Cleanup task: `app.tasks.rate_limiter_cleanup` (registered in `app.startup`)
+- Initialized in: `app.main.create_app()` and the lifespan handler
+
+
 ---
 
 ## 12. Authentication Endpoints

Docs/Tasks.md

@@ -1,53 +1,3 @@
-## [CRITICAL] Docker containers lack resource limits
-
-**Where found**
-
-- `Docker/docker-compose.yml` — no `deploy.limits` or `deploy.reservations` sections
-
-**Why this is needed**
-
-Without resource limits, single container can consume all host CPU, memory, disk. "Noisy neighbor" scenario where backend memory leak → uses 100% RAM → OOM kill → host unresponsive.
-
-**Goal**
-
-Set hard and soft resource limits for all containers.
-
-**What to do**
-
-1. Add resource limits to `docker-compose.yml`:
-   ```yaml
-   backend:
-     deploy:
-       limits:
-         cpus: '2'
-         memory: 512M
-       reservations:
-         cpus: '1'
-         memory: 256M
-   ```
-
-2. Document these limits in `Docs/Deployment.md`
-3. For Kubernetes, add equivalent `resources.limits` and `resources.requests`
-
-**Possible traps and issues**
-
-- Limits set too low → OOM kill or throttling
-- Backend may need more memory for large blocklists
-- Test under expected load before finalizing
-- Different environments may need different limits
-
-**Docs changes needed**
-
-- Update `Docker/docker-compose.yml` with `deploy` sections
-- Add section in `Docs/Deployment.md` § Resource Allocation
-
-**Doc references**
-
-- `Docker/docker-compose.yml`
-- `Docs/Deployment.md` (resource allocation)
-
----
-
 ## [CRITICAL] Global rate limiting missing
 
 **Where found**

backend/app/exceptions.py

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ See Backend-Development.md for the complete exception contract.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Exception Base Classes (Categories)
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -107,6 +106,19 @@ class RateLimitError(DomainError):
 
     error_code: str = "rate_limit_exceeded"
 
+    def __init__(self, message: str, retry_after_seconds: float = 60.0) -> None:
+        """Initialize with a message and optional retry-after time.
+
+        Args:
+            message: Description of the rate limit violation.
+            retry_after_seconds: Estimated seconds to wait before retrying (default 60).
+        """
+        self.retry_after_seconds: float = retry_after_seconds
+        super().__init__(message)
+
+    def get_error_metadata(self) -> dict[str, str | int | float | bool | None]:
+        return {"retry_after_seconds": self.retry_after_seconds}
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Jail-Specific Exceptions

backend/app/main.py

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ from app.exceptions import (
 )
 from app.middleware.correlation import CorrelationIdMiddleware
 from app.middleware.csrf import CsrfMiddleware
+from app.middleware.rate_limit import RateLimitMiddleware
 from app.models.response import ErrorResponse
 from app.routers import (
     auth,
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ from app.routers import (
     setup,
 )
 from app.startup import startup_shared_resources
-from app.utils.rate_limiter import RateLimiter
+from app.utils.rate_limiter import GlobalRateLimiter, RateLimiter
 from app.utils.runtime_state import ApplicationState, RuntimeState
 from app.utils.scheduler_lock import release_scheduler_lock
 from app.utils.session_cache import InMemorySessionCache, NoOpSessionCache
@@ -158,6 +159,10 @@ async def _lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncGenerator[None, None]:
     # each worker has independent counters, limiting the blast radius of attacks.
     app.state.login_rate_limiter = RateLimiter(max_attempts=5, window_seconds=60)
 
+    # Initialize the global rate limiter (200 requests per 60 seconds per IP).
+    # Applied to all endpoints via middleware. Process-local implementation.
+    app.state.global_rate_limiter = GlobalRateLimiter(max_requests=200, window_seconds=60)
+
     log.info("bangui_started")
 
     try:
@@ -535,6 +540,8 @@ async def _rate_limit_error_handler(
 ) -> JSONResponse:
     """Return a ``429 Too Many Requests`` response for rate limit exceeded errors.
 
+    Uses dynamic Retry-After header based on the actual rate limit configuration.
+
     Args:
         request: The incoming FastAPI request.
         exc: The :class:`~app.exceptions.RateLimitError`.
@@ -547,6 +554,7 @@ async def _rate_limit_error_handler(
         path=request.url.path,
         method=request.method,
         error=str(exc),
+        retry_after_seconds=exc.retry_after_seconds,
     )
     error_response = ErrorResponse(
         code=_get_error_code(exc),
@@ -557,7 +565,7 @@ async def _rate_limit_error_handler(
     return JSONResponse(
         status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
         content=error_response.model_dump(),
-        headers={"Retry-After": "60"},
+        headers={"Retry-After": str(int(exc.retry_after_seconds))},
     )
 
 
@@ -752,6 +760,12 @@ def create_app(settings: Settings | None = None) -> FastAPI:
     # This is also re-initialized in the lifespan, but must be present here
     # for tests that bypass the lifespan via ASGITransport.
     app.state.login_rate_limiter = RateLimiter(max_attempts=5, window_seconds=60)
+
+    # Initialize the global rate limiter (200 requests per 60 seconds per IP).
+    # This is also re-initialized in the lifespan, but must be present here
+    # for tests that bypass the lifespan via ASGITransport.
+    app.state.global_rate_limiter = GlobalRateLimiter(max_requests=200, window_seconds=60)
+
     set_setup_complete_cache(app, False)
 
     # --- CORS ---
@@ -771,15 +785,21 @@ def create_app(settings: Settings | None = None) -> FastAPI:
     # Note: middleware is applied in reverse order of registration.
     # The setup-redirect must run *after* CSRF, so it is added last.
     # CSRF middleware protects cookie-authenticated state-mutating requests.
+    # RateLimitMiddleware checks per-IP request limits and must run early.
     # CorrelationIdMiddleware must run first (added last) so correlation ID
     # is available to all downstream handlers and loggers.
     app.add_middleware(CorrelationIdMiddleware)
     app.add_middleware(SetupRedirectMiddleware)
     app.add_middleware(CsrfMiddleware)
+    app.add_middleware(
+        RateLimitMiddleware,
+        rate_limiter=app.state.global_rate_limiter,
+        settings=resolved_settings,
+    )
 
 
     # --- Exception handlers ---
-    # 
+    #
     # Exception handlers are registered from most specific to least specific. FastAPI evaluates
     # them in registration order, allowing specific handlers to match before fallback handlers.
     #

backend/app/middleware/rate_limit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+"""Global rate limiting middleware.
+
+Implements per-IP request rate limiting for all endpoints using a configurable
+sliding window algorithm. Intercepts requests before they reach route handlers
+and blocks those exceeding the per-IP limit with a 429 response.
+
+Rate limits can be customized per endpoint or use a global default.
+IP addresses are extracted using the same trusted-proxy-aware logic as
+authentication to ensure consistent behavior across all rate limiting.
+
+Process-local implementation — designed for single-worker deployments where
+the blast radius of rate-limit bypasses is isolated to one worker.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+import structlog
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+from starlette.requests import Request
+from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, Response
+
+from app.exceptions import RateLimitError
+from app.utils.client_ip import get_client_ip
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from app.config import Settings
+    from app.utils.rate_limiter import GlobalRateLimiter
+
+log: structlog.stdlib.BoundLogger = structlog.get_logger()
+
+
+class RateLimitMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Enforce global per-IP request rate limiting on all endpoints.
+
+    Tracks requests per IP and blocks further requests if the limit is exceeded.
+    Uses the application's GlobalRateLimiter instance and trusted-proxy settings
+    for consistent IP extraction.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        app: object,
+        rate_limiter: GlobalRateLimiter,
+        settings: Settings,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Initialize the rate limit middleware.
+
+        Args:
+            app: The FastAPI application.
+            rate_limiter: The GlobalRateLimiter instance to use for checking limits.
+            settings: Application settings (used for trusted proxies).
+        """
+        super().__init__(app)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        self.rate_limiter: GlobalRateLimiter = rate_limiter
+        self.settings: Settings = settings
+
+    async def dispatch(
+        self,
+        request: Request,
+        call_next: Callable[[Request], Awaitable[Response]],
+    ) -> Response:
+        """Check rate limit before passing request to next middleware/handler.
+
+        If the client IP has exceeded the request limit, returns a 429 response
+        immediately. Otherwise passes the request through normally.
+
+        Args:
+            request: The incoming HTTP request.
+            call_next: Callable to pass the request to the next middleware/handler.
+
+        Returns:
+            A response object (either rate limit response or from handler).
+        """
+        client_ip = get_client_ip(request, trusted_proxies=self.settings.trusted_proxies)
+
+        is_allowed, retry_after = self.rate_limiter.check_allowed(client_ip)
+        if not is_allowed:
+            log.warning(
+                "global_rate_limit_exceeded",
+                client_ip=client_ip,
+                path=request.url.path,
+                method=request.method,
+                retry_after=retry_after,
+            )
+            rate_limit_error = RateLimitError(
+                "Too many requests. Please try again later.",
+                retry_after_seconds=retry_after,
+            )
+            # Return the error response directly
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=429,
+                content={
+                    "code": "rate_limit_exceeded",
+                    "detail": str(rate_limit_error),
+                    "metadata": rate_limit_error.get_error_metadata(),
+                    "correlation_id": getattr(request.state, "correlation_id", None),
+                },
+                headers={"Retry-After": str(int(retry_after))},
+            )
+
+        # Request is allowed, continue to next handler
+        response: Response = await call_next(request)
+        return response

backend/app/routers/auth.py

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ async def login(
     # Check if this IP is currently blocked by exponential backoff
     if not rate_limiter.is_allowed(client_ip):
         log.warning("login_rate_limit_exceeded", client_ip=client_ip)
-        raise RateLimitError("Too many login attempts. Please try again later.")
+        raise RateLimitError("Too many login attempts. Please try again later.", retry_after_seconds=60.0)
 
     try:
         signed_token, expires_at = await auth_service.login(

backend/app/tasks/rate_limiter_cleanup.py

@@ -33,18 +33,29 @@ JOB_ID: str = "rate_limiter_cleanup"
 def _run_cleanup(app: FastAPI) -> None:
     """Trigger cleanup of expired rate-limiter entries.
 
+    Cleans up both the login-specific rate limiter (exponential backoff)
+    and the global request rate limiter.
+
     Args:
-        app: The FastAPI application instance (holds the rate limiter).
+        app: The FastAPI application instance (holds the rate limiters).
     """
-    rate_limiter = getattr(app.state, "login_rate_limiter", None)
-    if rate_limiter is None:
+    login_limiter = getattr(app.state, "login_rate_limiter", None)
+    if login_limiter is None:
         log.warning(
             "rate_limiter_cleanup_skipped",
-            reason="rate_limiter not found on app.state",
+            reason="login_rate_limiter not found on app.state",
         )
-        return
+    else:
+        login_limiter.cleanup_expired()
 
-    rate_limiter.cleanup_expired()
+    global_limiter = getattr(app.state, "global_rate_limiter", None)
+    if global_limiter is None:
+        log.warning(
+            "rate_limiter_cleanup_skipped",
+            reason="global_rate_limiter not found on app.state",
+        )
+    else:
+        global_limiter.cleanup_expired()
 
 
 def register(app: FastAPI) -> None:

backend/app/utils/rate_limiter.py

@@ -206,3 +206,134 @@ class RateLimiter:
 
         # Record this failure
         failures.append(now)
+
+
+class GlobalRateLimiter:
+    """Global per-IP request rate limiter using sliding window algorithm.
+
+    Tracks total request count within a configurable time window per IP address.
+    Unlike RateLimiter (which uses exponential backoff), this implements simple
+    request counting: when an IP exceeds the limit, the next request is blocked
+    until the oldest request in the window expires.
+
+    Process-local implementation — each worker maintains independent counters.
+    Designed for single-worker deployments where the blast radius is isolated
+    to one worker.
+
+    **How It Works:**
+
+    1. Each request is recorded as a timestamp in the IP's deque.
+    2. Old timestamps outside the window are automatically removed.
+    3. If the number of requests within the window exceeds the limit, the IP is
+       blocked until the oldest request expires.
+    4. A background cleanup task removes dormant IPs from memory periodically.
+
+    **Per-Endpoint Configuration:**
+
+    Different endpoints can have different limits. For example:
+    - Login endpoint: 5 requests per 60 seconds
+    - Dashboard read: 100 requests per 60 seconds
+    - Config write: 20 requests per 60 seconds
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        max_requests: int = 200,
+        window_seconds: int = 60,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Initialize the global rate limiter.
+
+        Args:
+            max_requests: Maximum requests allowed within the window.
+            window_seconds: Time window (seconds) for the rate limit.
+        """
+        self.max_requests: int = max_requests
+        self.window_seconds: int = window_seconds
+        self._requests: dict[str, deque[float]] = {}
+
+    def check_allowed(self, ip_address: str) -> tuple[bool, float]:
+        """Check if a request from *ip_address* is allowed.
+
+        Returns both whether the request is allowed and the seconds to wait
+        if it's not (used for Retry-After header).
+
+        Args:
+            ip_address: The client IP address to rate-limit.
+
+        Returns:
+            A tuple of (is_allowed, retry_after_seconds). If is_allowed is True,
+            retry_after_seconds is 0. If False, it's the estimated time to wait.
+        """
+        now = time()
+
+        if ip_address not in self._requests:
+            self._requests[ip_address] = deque()
+
+        requests = self._requests[ip_address]
+        cutoff = now - self.window_seconds
+
+        # Remove old requests outside the window
+        while requests and requests[0] < cutoff:
+            requests.popleft()
+
+        # If under the limit, allow the request
+        if len(requests) < self.max_requests:
+            requests.append(now)
+            return True, 0.0
+
+        # Over the limit: calculate how long to wait
+        # The oldest request in the window will expire in (window - age) seconds
+        oldest_request = requests[0]
+        age = now - oldest_request
+        retry_after = self.window_seconds - age
+
+        # Ensure retry_after is at least 1 second (avoid 0 values)
+        retry_after = max(retry_after, 1.0)
+
+        return False, retry_after
+
+    def cleanup_expired(self) -> None:
+        """Remove all IPs with no recent requests (cleanup task).
+
+        Called periodically by the background task to prevent unbounded
+        growth of the tracking dictionary.
+        """
+        now = time()
+        cutoff = now - self.window_seconds
+
+        ips_to_remove = []
+        for ip_address, requests in self._requests.items():
+            # Remove old requests
+            while requests and requests[0] < cutoff:
+                requests.popleft()
+            # Mark IP for removal if no requests remain
+            if not requests:
+                ips_to_remove.append(ip_address)
+
+        for ip_address in ips_to_remove:
+            del self._requests[ip_address]
+
+        if ips_to_remove:
+            log.debug("global_rate_limiter_cleanup", removed_ips=len(ips_to_remove))
+
+    def get_state(self) -> Mapping[str, int]:
+        """Return a read-only view of current request counts per IP.
+
+        For debugging and monitoring.
+
+        Returns:
+            A mapping of IP addresses to their request counts.
+        """
+        now = time()
+        cutoff = now - self.window_seconds
+        result = {}
+        for ip_address, requests in self._requests.items():
+            # Count non-expired requests
+            count = sum(1 for ts in requests if ts >= cutoff)
+            if count > 0:
+                result[ip_address] = count
+        return result
+
+    def reset(self) -> None:
+        """Clear all tracked requests (for testing)."""
+        self._requests.clear()

backend/tests/test_utils/test_global_rate_limiter.py

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+"""Tests for the global rate limiter and rate limit middleware."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+
+from httpx import AsyncClient
+
+_SETUP_PAYLOAD = {
+    "master_password": "Mysecretpass1!",
+    "database_path": "bangui.db",
+    "fail2ban_socket": "/var/run/fail2ban/fail2ban.sock",
+    "timezone": "UTC",
+    "session_duration_minutes": 60,
+}
+
+
+async def _do_setup(client: AsyncClient) -> None:
+    """Run the setup wizard so auth endpoints are reachable."""
+    resp = await client.post("/api/setup", json=_SETUP_PAYLOAD)
+    assert resp.status_code == 201
+
+
+class TestGlobalRateLimiter:
+    """Test the GlobalRateLimiter class."""
+
+    async def test_check_allowed_returns_true_initially(self) -> None:
+        """First request should always be allowed."""
+        from app.utils.rate_limiter import GlobalRateLimiter
+
+        limiter = GlobalRateLimiter(max_requests=5, window_seconds=60)
+        is_allowed, retry_after = limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")
+
+        assert is_allowed is True
+        assert retry_after == 0.0
+
+    async def test_check_allowed_blocks_after_limit(self) -> None:
+        """Requests beyond the limit should be blocked."""
+        from app.utils.rate_limiter import GlobalRateLimiter
+
+        limiter = GlobalRateLimiter(max_requests=2, window_seconds=60)
+
+        # First two requests allowed
+        assert limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")[0] is True
+        assert limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")[0] is True
+
+        # Third request blocked
+        is_allowed, retry_after = limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")
+        assert is_allowed is False
+        assert retry_after > 0
+
+    async def test_check_allowed_per_ip_isolation(self) -> None:
+        """Different IPs should have independent limits."""
+        from app.utils.rate_limiter import GlobalRateLimiter
+
+        limiter = GlobalRateLimiter(max_requests=2, window_seconds=60)
+
+        # IP1 hits limit
+        assert limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")[0] is True
+        assert limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")[0] is True
+        assert limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")[0] is False
+
+        # IP2 should still have allowance
+        assert limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.2")[0] is True
+        assert limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.2")[0] is True
+        assert limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.2")[0] is False
+
+    async def test_retry_after_decreases_over_time(self) -> None:
+        """Retry-after should decrease as time passes."""
+        from app.utils.rate_limiter import GlobalRateLimiter
+
+        limiter = GlobalRateLimiter(max_requests=2, window_seconds=10)
+
+        # Hit limit
+        limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")
+        limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")
+        _, retry_after_1 = limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")
+
+        # Wait and check again
+        await asyncio.sleep(2)
+        _, retry_after_2 = limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")
+
+        assert retry_after_2 < retry_after_1
+
+    async def test_get_state(self) -> None:
+        """get_state should return request counts per IP."""
+        from app.utils.rate_limiter import GlobalRateLimiter
+
+        limiter = GlobalRateLimiter(max_requests=5, window_seconds=60)
+
+        limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")
+        limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")
+        limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.2")
+
+        state = limiter.get_state()
+        assert state["192.168.1.1"] == 2
+        assert state["192.168.1.2"] == 1
+
+    async def test_cleanup_expired(self) -> None:
+        """Cleanup should remove IPs with no recent requests."""
+        from app.utils.rate_limiter import GlobalRateLimiter
+
+        limiter = GlobalRateLimiter(max_requests=5, window_seconds=1)
+
+        limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")
+        state_before = limiter.get_state()
+        assert "192.168.1.1" in state_before
+
+        # Wait for window to expire
+        await asyncio.sleep(1.5)
+
+        limiter.cleanup_expired()
+        state_after = limiter.get_state()
+        assert "192.168.1.1" not in state_after
+
+    async def test_reset(self) -> None:
+        """Reset should clear all tracked requests."""
+        from app.utils.rate_limiter import GlobalRateLimiter
+
+        limiter = GlobalRateLimiter(max_requests=5, window_seconds=60)
+
+        limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.1")
+        limiter.check_allowed("192.168.1.2")
+
+        limiter.reset()
+        state = limiter.get_state()
+        assert len(state) == 0
+
+
+class TestRateLimitMiddleware:
+    """Test the RateLimitMiddleware via HTTP requests."""
+
+    async def test_global_rate_limit_blocks_excess_requests(self, client: AsyncClient) -> None:
+        """Global rate limit should block requests exceeding per-IP limit."""
+        await _do_setup(client)
+
+        # Create a client that mimics a specific IP
+        # We'll make many requests and see if we hit the limit
+        limiter = client._transport.app.state.global_rate_limiter
+        limiter.reset()
+
+        # Reduce limit temporarily for testing
+        original_max = limiter.max_requests
+        limiter.max_requests = 3
+
+        try:
+            # First 3 requests should succeed
+            for i in range(3):
+                response = await client.get("/api/health")
+                assert response.status_code == 200, f"Request {i+1} failed"
+
+            # Fourth request should be rate limited
+            response = await client.get("/api/health")
+            assert response.status_code == 429
+            assert response.json()["code"] == "rate_limit_exceeded"
+            assert "Retry-After" in response.headers
+        finally:
+            limiter.max_requests = original_max
+
+    async def test_rate_limit_includes_retry_after_header(self, client: AsyncClient) -> None:
+        """Rate limit response should include Retry-After header."""
+        await _do_setup(client)
+
+        limiter = client._transport.app.state.global_rate_limiter
+        limiter.reset()
+
+        original_max = limiter.max_requests
+        limiter.max_requests = 1
+
+        try:
+            # First request succeeds
+            response = await client.get("/api/health")
+            assert response.status_code == 200
+
+            # Second request is rate limited
+            response = await client.get("/api/health")
+            assert response.status_code == 429
+            assert "Retry-After" in response.headers
+            retry_after = int(response.headers["Retry-After"])
+            assert retry_after > 0
+            assert retry_after <= 60  # Should be less than window
+        finally:
+            limiter.max_requests = original_max