Docs/Architekture.md

@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ BanGUI maintains its **own SQLite database** (separate from the fail2ban databas
 | Table | Purpose |
 |---|---|
 | `settings` | Key-value store for application configuration (master password hash, fail2ban socket path, database path, timezone, session duration) |
-| `sessions` | Active session tokens with expiry timestamps |
+| `sessions` | Active session token hashes with expiry timestamps. Tokens are stored as one-way SHA256 hashes to prevent token hijacking if the database is exposed. |
 | `geo_cache` | Resolved IP geolocation results (ip, country_code, country_name, asn, org, cached_at). Loaded into memory at startup via `load_cache_from_db()`; new entries are flushed back by the `geo_cache_flush` background task. |
 | `blocklist_sources` | Registered blocklist URLs (id, name, url, enabled, created_at, updated_at) |
 | `import_logs` | Record of every blocklist import run (id, source_id, timestamp, ips_imported, ips_skipped, errors, status) |
@@ -665,7 +665,8 @@ BanGUI maintains its **own SQLite database** (separate from the fail2ban databas
 
 - **Single-user model** — one master password, no usernames.
 - Password is hashed with a strong algorithm (e.g., bcrypt or argon2) and stored in the application database during setup.
-- Sessions are token-based, stored server-side in the `sessions` table, and delivered to the browser as HTTP-only secure cookies.
+- Sessions are token-based, stored server-side in the `sessions` table as one-way SHA256 hashes, and delivered to the browser as HTTP-only secure cookies.
+- **Session token hashing** — Session tokens are hashed before storage to prevent token hijacking if the database file is exposed. Only the hash (`token_hash`) is stored in the database; the raw token is never persisted. When validating a session, the incoming token is hashed before the database lookup. This ensures the database alone is not sufficient to usurp a session — an attacker would also need knowledge of the original token value.
 - Session expiry is configurable (set during setup, stored in `settings`).
 - The frontend `AuthProvider` checks session validity on mount and redirects to `/login` if invalid.
 - The backend `dependencies.py` provides an `authenticated` dependency that validates the session cookie on every protected endpoint.

Docs/Backend-Development.md

@@ -1001,7 +1001,88 @@ async def get_session_repo() -> SessionRepository:
 - Before each deployment, run `mypy --strict` to ensure all dependency providers return values compatible with their Protocol types.
 - The `cast()` calls in `dependencies.py` are a documented signal that structural compatibility is being verified externally, not via explicit class inheritance.
 
-#### 13.7.2 Session Cache Pluggability — Process-Local vs. Shared Backends
+#### 13.7.2 Session Token Hashing — One-Way Protection Against Database Exposure
+
+Session tokens must be protected against database exposure. **Session tokens are stored as one-way SHA256 hashes in the database** to ensure that if the database file is compromised (volume mount misconfiguration, backup leak, etc.), the session tokens themselves cannot be directly used to hijack sessions.
+
+**Implementation pattern:**
+
+```python
+import hashlib
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    import aiosqlite
+
+from app.models.auth import Session
+
+def _hash_token(token: str) -> str:
+    """Return the SHA256 hash of a session token."""
+    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
+
+async def create_session(
+    db: "aiosqlite.Connection",
+    token: str,
+    created_at: str,
+    expires_at: str,
+) -> Session:
+    """Insert a new session row with the token hash."""
+    token_hash = _hash_token(token)
+    cursor = await db.execute(
+        "INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, created_at, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
+        (token_hash, created_at, expires_at),
+    )
+    await db.commit()
+    # Return the Session with the ORIGINAL token (not the hash)
+    # so the service layer can sign and return it to the client.
+    return Session(
+        id=int(cursor.lastrowid) if cursor.lastrowid else 0,
+        token=token,  # ← raw token, not the hash
+        created_at=created_at,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+    )
+
+async def get_session(
+    db: "aiosqlite.Connection",
+    token: str
+) -> Session | None:
+    """Look up a session by token hash."""
+    token_hash = _hash_token(token)
+    async with db.execute(
+        "SELECT id, token_hash, created_at, expires_at FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?",
+        (token_hash,),
+    ) as cursor:
+        row = await cursor.fetchone()
+    
+    if row is None:
+        return None
+    
+    # Return the Session with the INCOMING token (the one the client sent).
+    return Session(
+        id=int(row[0]),
+        token=token,  # ← the raw token passed in
+        created_at=str(row[2]),
+        expires_at=str(row[3]),
+    )
+```
+
+**Key points:**
+
+1. **Hash on write** — When inserting a session, hash the token before storage.
+2. **Hash on read** — When validating a session, hash the incoming token before the database lookup.
+3. **Never store raw tokens** — The `token_hash` column contains only hashes; raw tokens are never persisted.
+4. **Return raw tokens to the service layer** — The `Session` model's `token` field contains the raw token (for signing and response), not the hash.
+5. **Database schema** — Use `token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE` instead of `token TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE`, and create an index on `token_hash`.
+6. **Migration strategy** — When upgrading from plaintext to hashed tokens, drop the old table and recreate it. This invalidates all existing sessions, which is acceptable because the database was exposed in plaintext.
+
+**Why one-way hashing is safe:**
+- If an attacker obtains a token hash from the database, they cannot reverse the SHA256 hash to recover the original token.
+- The attacker cannot use the hash directly in a client request — they would need the original token to pass the hash check.
+- This forces the attacker to either compromise the client (where they'd also get the raw token) or perform a brute-force attack against the hash space (infeasible for random 128-bit tokens).
+
+**Never use symmetric encryption** — symmetric encryption stores a key in the database or environment, which merely shifts the exposure risk. A one-way hash is the correct choice for protecting tokens.
+
+#### 13.7.3 Session Cache Pluggability — Process-Local vs. Shared Backends
 
 Session validation is expensive (SQLite lookup + password verification). To improve performance, **validated session tokens are cached** using the `SessionCache` interface (`app.utils.session_cache`). The default implementation, `InMemorySessionCache`, stores cached sessions in process-local memory.
 

Docs/Tasks.md

@@ -1,31 +1,3 @@
-## TASK-021 — `set_jail_config_enabled` and `write_jail_config_file` not atomic
-
-**Severity:** Medium
-
-### Where found
-`backend/app/services/raw_config_io_service.py` lines ~268 (`set_jail_config_enabled`) and ~344 (`write_jail_config_file`) — both use `path.write_text(updated)` directly.
-
-### Why this is needed
-Same root cause as TASK-018. A process kill mid-write leaves the jail config file corrupted, disabling that jail on next fail2ban reload.
-
-### Goal
-Atomic writes for `set_jail_config_enabled` and `write_jail_config_file`.
-
-### What to do
-Same as TASK-018: replace `path.write_text(content)` with the `NamedTemporaryFile` + `os.replace()` pattern in both functions. This is most efficiently done as part of TASK-018 by extracting a shared `atomic_write(path, content)` helper in `config_file_helpers.py`.
-
-### Possible traps and issues
-- Same as TASK-018.
-- Extracting the helper makes TASK-018 and TASK-021 a single coordinated change.
-
-### Docs changes needed
-- `Backend-Development.md` — atomic write helper documentation.
-
-### Doc references
-- [Backend-Development.md](Backend-Development.md) — file I/O conventions
-
----
-
 ## TASK-022 — Session tokens stored in plaintext in SQLite
 
 **Severity:** High

backend/app/db.py

@@ -30,15 +30,15 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS settings (
 
 _CREATE_SESSIONS: str = """
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (
-    id          INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    token       TEXT    NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-    created_at  TEXT    NOT NULL DEFAULT (strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now')),
-    expires_at  TEXT    NOT NULL
+    id              INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    token_hash      TEXT    NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    created_at      TEXT    NOT NULL DEFAULT (strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now')),
+    expires_at      TEXT    NOT NULL
 );
 """
 
 _CREATE_SESSIONS_TOKEN_INDEX: str = """
-CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_token ON sessions (token);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_token_hash ON sessions (token_hash);
 """
 
 _CREATE_BLOCKLIST_SOURCES: str = """
@@ -107,10 +107,24 @@ _SCHEMA_STATEMENTS: list[str] = [
     _CREATE_HISTORY_ARCHIVE,
 ]
 
-_CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION: int = 1
+_CURRENT_SCHEMA_VERSION: int = 2
 
 _MIGRATIONS: dict[int, str] = {
     1: "\n".join(_SCHEMA_STATEMENTS),
+    2: """
+-- Migration 2: Hash session tokens for security.
+-- Drop the old sessions table and recreate with token_hash column.
+-- This invalidates all existing sessions, which is acceptable as the DB
+-- contents were exposed in plaintext.
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS sessions;
+CREATE TABLE sessions (
+    id              INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
+    token_hash      TEXT    NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    created_at      TEXT    NOT NULL DEFAULT (strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%fZ', 'now')),
+    expires_at      TEXT    NOT NULL
+);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_sessions_token_hash ON sessions (token_hash);
+""",
 }
 
 

backend/app/repositories/session_repo.py

@@ -2,10 +2,15 @@
 
 Provides storage, retrieval, and deletion of session records in the
 ``sessions`` table of the application SQLite database.
+
+Session tokens are stored as one-way SHA256 hashes to ensure that if the
+database is exposed, the session tokens themselves cannot be directly used.
+The hash is computed from the raw token before all database operations.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import hashlib
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
@@ -14,6 +19,18 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
 from app.models.auth import Session
 
 
+def _hash_token(token: str) -> str:
+    """Return the SHA256 hash of a session token.
+
+    Args:
+        token: The raw session token to hash.
+
+    Returns:
+        The hexadecimal SHA256 digest of the token.
+    """
+    return hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
 async def create_session(
     db: aiosqlite.Connection,
     token: str,
@@ -30,10 +47,15 @@ async def create_session(
 
     Returns:
         The newly created :class:`~app.models.auth.Session`.
+
+    Note:
+        The token is hashed before storage. The returned Session object
+        contains the original raw token for use in signing and response.
     """
+    token_hash = _hash_token(token)
     cursor = await db.execute(
-        "INSERT INTO sessions (token, created_at, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
-        (token, created_at, expires_at),
+        "INSERT INTO sessions (token_hash, created_at, expires_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
+        (token_hash, created_at, expires_at),
     )
     await db.commit()
     return Session(
@@ -53,10 +75,14 @@ async def get_session(db: aiosqlite.Connection, token: str) -> Session | None:
 
     Returns:
         The :class:`~app.models.auth.Session` if found, else ``None``.
+
+    Note:
+        The token is hashed before the database lookup.
     """
+    token_hash = _hash_token(token)
     async with db.execute(
-        "SELECT id, token, created_at, expires_at FROM sessions WHERE token = ?",
-        (token,),
+        "SELECT id, token_hash, created_at, expires_at FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?",
+        (token_hash,),
     ) as cursor:
         row = await cursor.fetchone()
 
@@ -65,7 +91,7 @@ async def get_session(db: aiosqlite.Connection, token: str) -> Session | None:
 
     return Session(
         id=int(row[0]),
-        token=str(row[1]),
+        token=token,
         created_at=str(row[2]),
         expires_at=str(row[3]),
     )
@@ -77,8 +103,12 @@ async def delete_session(db: aiosqlite.Connection, token: str) -> None:
     Args:
         db: Active aiosqlite connection.
         token: The session token to remove.
+
+    Note:
+        The token is hashed before the database lookup.
     """
-    await db.execute("DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token = ?", (token,))
+    token_hash = _hash_token(token)
+    await db.execute("DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?", (token_hash,))
     await db.commit()
 
 

backend/tests/test_repositories/test_db_init.py

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ async def test_init_db_records_schema_version(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
         ) as cursor:
             row = await cursor.fetchone()
     assert row is not None
-    assert row[0] == 1
+    assert row[0] == 2
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
@@ -97,4 +97,4 @@ async def test_init_db_migrates_legacy_database_without_schema_version(tmp_path:
         ) as cursor:
             row = await cursor.fetchone()
     assert row is not None
-    assert row[0] == 1
+    assert row[0] == 2

backend/tests/test_repositories/test_settings_and_session.py

@@ -116,3 +116,28 @@ class TestSessionRepo:
         assert deleted == 1
         assert await session_repo.get_session(db, "expired") is None
         assert await session_repo.get_session(db, "valid") is not None
+
+    async def test_tokens_are_hashed_in_database(
+        self, db: aiosqlite.Connection
+    ) -> None:
+        """Verify that tokens are stored as hashes, not plaintext."""
+        import hashlib
+
+        token = "plaintext_token_12345"
+        await session_repo.create_session(
+            db,
+            token=token,
+            created_at="2025-01-01T00:00:00+00:00",
+            expires_at="2025-01-01T01:00:00+00:00",
+        )
+
+        # Query the database directly to verify the token is hashed.
+        async with db.execute("SELECT token_hash FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?", (hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest(),)) as cursor:
+            row = await cursor.fetchone()
+        assert row is not None
+        assert row[0] == hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
+
+        # The plaintext token should not be in the database.
+        async with db.execute("SELECT * FROM sessions WHERE token_hash = ?", (token,)) as cursor:
+            row = await cursor.fetchone()
+        assert row is None