Stale sessions from a stolen device could be reused up to the cache TTL after a legitimate user re-logs in, because login never cleared the existing cache entry. Changes: - Add invalidate_by_user(user_id) to SessionCache protocol - InMemorySessionCache maintains a user_id -> set[token] index to support O(1) invalidation of all sessions for a given user - NoOpSessionCache stub updated for API compatibility - auth_service.login() now returns the Session object alongside signed_token and expires_at - login router calls session_cache.invalidate_by_user(session.id) immediately after successful authentication Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
231 lines
8.3 KiB
Python
231 lines
8.3 KiB
Python
"""Authentication router.
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``POST /api/auth/login`` — verify master password and issue a session.
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``POST /api/auth/logout`` — revoke the current session.
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The session token is set as an ``HttpOnly`` ``SameSite=Lax`` cookie for
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browser-based SPAs. The cookie is automatically included in all requests
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and is inaccessible to JavaScript, protecting it from XSS attacks and
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malicious scripts.
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For programmatic API clients (non-browser), use ``POST /api/auth/token``
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which returns a token in the response body for use in the ``Authorization``
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header. This endpoint does not set a cookie.
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Rate limiting uses exponential backoff: each wrong password attempt incurs
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a progressive delay (0.5s, 1s, 2s, 4s, 5s max) per IP address. Requests
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blocked by this delay return ``429 Too Many Requests`` with a ``Retry-After``
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header.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import structlog
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Request, Response
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from app.dependencies import (
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AuthDep,
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LoginRateLimiterDep,
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SessionCacheDep,
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SessionServiceContextDep,
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SettingsDep,
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)
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from app.exceptions import AuthenticationError, RateLimitError
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from app.models.auth import LoginRequest, LoginResponse, LogoutResponse, SessionValidResponse
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from app.services import auth_service
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from app.utils.client_ip import get_client_ip
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from app.utils.constants import SESSION_COOKIE_NAME
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log: structlog.stdlib.BoundLogger = structlog.get_logger()
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/auth", tags=["auth"])
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@router.post(
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"/login",
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response_model=LoginResponse,
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summary="Authenticate with the master password",
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responses={
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200: {"description": "Login successful", "model": LoginResponse},
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401: {"description": "Invalid password"},
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422: {"description": "Validation error — invalid request body"},
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429: {"description": "Too many login attempts, retry after delay"},
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503: {"description": "Setup not complete"},
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},
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)
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async def login(
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body: LoginRequest,
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response: Response,
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request: Request,
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session_ctx: SessionServiceContextDep,
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settings: SettingsDep,
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rate_limiter: LoginRateLimiterDep,
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session_cache: SessionCacheDep,
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) -> LoginResponse:
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"""Verify the master password and return a session token.
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On success the token is also set as an ``HttpOnly`` ``SameSite=Lax``
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cookie so the browser SPA benefits from automatic credential handling.
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Rate limiting: Exponential backoff on failed attempts. Each wrong password
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incurs an increasing delay (0.5s, 1s, 2s, 4s, 5s max per IP address).
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Requests during the penalty period return ``429 Too Many Requests`` with
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a ``Retry-After`` header.
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Cache invalidation: On successful login, any existing cached sessions for
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the same user are invalidated so that stale tokens (e.g., from a stolen
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device) cannot be reused beyond the cache TTL window.
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Args:
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body: Login request validated by Pydantic.
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response: FastAPI response object used to set the cookie.
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request: The incoming HTTP request (used to extract client IP).
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session_ctx: Session service context containing db and repository.
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settings: Application settings (used for session duration and trusted proxies).
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rate_limiter: The login rate limiter (per IP).
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session_cache: Session cache for invalidating old sessions on login.
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Returns:
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:class:`~app.models.auth.LoginResponse` containing the token.
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Raises:
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AuthenticationError: if the password is incorrect.
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RateLimitError: if the rate limit is exceeded.
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"""
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client_ip = get_client_ip(request, trusted_proxies=settings.trusted_proxies)
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# Check if this IP is currently blocked by exponential backoff
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if not rate_limiter.is_allowed(client_ip):
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log.warning("login_rate_limit_exceeded", client_ip=client_ip)
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raise RateLimitError("Too many login attempts. Please try again later.", retry_after_seconds=60.0)
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try:
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signed_token, expires_at, session = await auth_service.login(
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session_ctx.db,
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password=body.password,
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session_duration_minutes=settings.session_duration_minutes,
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session_secret=settings.session_secret,
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session_repo=session_ctx.session_repo,
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)
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except ValueError as exc:
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# Record this failure to increment the exponential backoff counter
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rate_limiter.record_failure(client_ip)
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log.warning("login_failed", client_ip=client_ip, error=str(exc))
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raise AuthenticationError(str(exc)) from exc
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# Invalidate any cached sessions for the same user to prevent reuse of
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# stale tokens (e.g., from a stolen device) beyond the cache TTL window.
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session_cache.invalidate_by_user(session.id)
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response.set_cookie(
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key=SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
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value=signed_token,
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httponly=settings.session_cookie_httponly,
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samesite=settings.session_cookie_samesite,
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secure=settings.session_cookie_secure,
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max_age=settings.session_duration_minutes * 60,
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)
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log.info("login_success", client_ip=client_ip)
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return LoginResponse(expires_at=expires_at)
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@router.get(
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"/session",
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response_model=SessionValidResponse,
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summary="Validate the current session",
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responses={
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200: {"description": "Session valid", "model": SessionValidResponse},
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401: {"description": "Session missing, expired, or invalid"},
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},
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)
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async def validate_session(
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_: AuthDep,
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) -> SessionValidResponse:
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"""Validate the current session.
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This endpoint requires a valid session and returns 200 if the session is
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valid and still active. If the session is invalid, expired, or missing,
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FastAPI's ``require_auth`` dependency returns 401 automatically.
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The frontend calls this on mount to bootstrap its authentication state
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from the backend rather than relying solely on cached ``sessionStorage``.
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Args:
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_: The injected session object (unused, but its presence triggers validation).
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Returns:
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:class:`~app.models.auth.SessionValidResponse` confirming the session state.
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"""
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return SessionValidResponse(valid=True)
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@router.post(
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"/logout",
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response_model=LogoutResponse,
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summary="Revoke the current session",
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responses={
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200: {"description": "Logout successful", "model": LogoutResponse},
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401: {"description": "Session missing or invalid (silently successful)"},
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},
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)
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async def logout(
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request: Request,
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response: Response,
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session_ctx: SessionServiceContextDep,
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settings: SettingsDep,
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session_cache: SessionCacheDep,
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) -> LogoutResponse:
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"""Invalidate the active session.
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The session token is read from the ``bangui_session`` cookie or the
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``Authorization: Bearer`` header. If no token is present the request
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is silently treated as a successful logout (idempotent).
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Args:
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request: FastAPI request (used to extract the token).
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response: FastAPI response (used to clear the cookie).
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session_ctx: Session service context containing db and repository.
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settings: Application settings (used to unwrap signed tokens).
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session_cache: Session cache for invalidation.
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Returns:
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:class:`~app.models.auth.LogoutResponse`.
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"""
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token = _extract_token(request)
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if token:
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raw_token = await auth_service.logout(
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session_ctx.db,
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token,
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settings.session_secret,
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settings.session_secret_previous,
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session_repo=session_ctx.session_repo,
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)
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if raw_token:
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session_cache.invalidate(raw_token)
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session_cache.invalidate(token)
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response.delete_cookie(key=SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
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return LogoutResponse()
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Helpers
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _extract_token(request: Request) -> str | None:
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"""Extract the session token from cookie or Authorization header.
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Args:
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request: The incoming FastAPI request.
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Returns:
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The token string, or ``None`` if absent.
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"""
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token: str | None = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
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if token:
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return token
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auth_header: str = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
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if auth_header.startswith("Bearer "):
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return auth_header[len("Bearer "):]
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return None
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