Refactor rate limiting with exponential backoff strategy
- Update rate limiter to use exponential backoff instead of fixed limit - Implement progressive delays for failed login attempts (0.5s, 1s, 2s, 4s, 5s max) - Update auth router documentation and endpoint docs - Refactor test suite to match new rate limiting behavior - Update backend development documentation - Clean up unused tasks documentation Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1170,6 +1170,7 @@ The `setup_completed = "1"` key is still written for backward compatibility with
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- **GeoCache** — `GeoCache` instance is created at startup with a configurable `allow_http_fallback` flag and stored on `app.state.geo_cache`. It implements a primary + fallback resolution strategy: (1) try local MaxMind GeoLite2-Country MMDB database (primary, encrypted, no network traffic), (2) if unavailable/no result and allowed, fall back to ip-api.com HTTP API (unencrypted, disabled by default for security). Encapsulates in-memory lookup cache, negative cache for unresolvable IPs (5-minute TTL), dirty set for persistence, and thread-safe async locking. Cache is loaded from the `geo_cache` SQLite table on startup. New resolutions are accumulated in memory and periodically flushed to the database by the `geo_cache_flush` background task. Stale entries are re-resolved by the `geo_re_resolve` task. Injected into routes and tasks via FastAPI's dependency system. See Backend-Development.md § IP Geolocation Resolution for setup and security details.
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- **Runtime state** (`RuntimeState` in `app.utils.runtime_state`) — stores mutable application state: `server_status` (fail2ban online/offline), `last_activation` (jail activation tracking), `pending_recovery` (crash detection), `runtime_settings` (effective configuration), and service-specific state holders like `jail_service_state` (`JailServiceState` for jail capability detection cache). RuntimeState fields are managed through dedicated functions (e.g., `record_activation()`, `clear_pending_recovery()`) and via dependency injection to services. Service-specific state (like `JailServiceState`) is nested within `RuntimeState` to keep all mutable state in one controlled location. **⚠️ RuntimeState is process-local and only safe when BanGUI runs as a single asyncio worker.** Mutations must not span `await` points (cooperative scheduling within a single event loop is safe). In multi-worker deployments, each process has its own copy — logouts from worker A don't affect worker B's cache, health status updates are per-worker, and activation tracking is unreliable. BanGUI enforces single-worker mode (TASK-002) to prevent this issue. For future multi-worker support, replace RuntimeState with a shared coordination backend (Redis, shared memory, database). See `app/utils/runtime_state.py` module docstring for details.
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- **Setup-completion flag** — once `is_setup_complete()` returns `True`, the result is stored in `app.state._setup_complete_cached`. The `SetupRedirectMiddleware` skips the DB query on all subsequent requests, removing 1 SQL query per request for the common post-setup case. The completion flag is only written after the runtime database is successfully initialized and all initial setup settings are persisted, preventing a failed setup from permanently bypassing the setup wizard.
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- **Login Rate Limiting** — the `/api/auth/login` endpoint employs exponential backoff to defend against brute-force attacks. Each failed login attempt is recorded per client IP, and subsequent attempts within the backoff window return HTTP 429 Too Many Requests. The penalty grows exponentially with each consecutive failure (2s, 4s, 8s, up to 10s max), ensuring attackers face rapidly increasing delays. This is complemented by bcrypt password hashing (≈100ms per attempt), which adds computational resistance without blocking legitimate users. The backoff counter resets after 60 seconds without additional failures. The rate limiter is process-local and tracks failures in memory via `app.utils.rate_limiter.RateLimiter`, stored on `app.state.login_rate_limiter`. Client IP detection respects proxy headers (`X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Real-IP`) only from configured trusted proxies, preventing header spoofing attacks. In multi-worker deployments, each worker has independent rate limit counters; BanGUI enforces single-worker mode (TASK-002) to prevent attackers from bypassing limits by distributing requests across workers.
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### 8.1 CSRF Protection
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@@ -2169,17 +2169,22 @@ await config_service.update_global_config(socket_path, update) # Validates agai
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### Login Rate Limiting
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The login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) is protected against brute-force attacks using an in-memory rate limiter.
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The login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) is protected against brute-force attacks using an in-memory exponential backoff rate limiter.
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**Design:**
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- Uses a `dict[str, deque[float]]` keyed by client IP, storing login attempt timestamps within a time window.
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- Attempts outside the window are automatically removed during validation checks.
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- Uses a `dict[str, deque[float]]` keyed by client IP, storing failed login timestamps within a time window.
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- Old failures outside the time window are automatically pruned during validation checks.
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- Expired IP entries are cleaned up to prevent unbounded memory growth.
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**Rate Limit Rules:**
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- **5 attempts per 60 seconds** per IP address.
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- Requests exceeding the limit return **HTTP 429 Too Many Requests** with a `Retry-After` header.
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- Each failed login triggers a progressive server-side delay (exponential back-off, 1–10 seconds) to further slow attacks, on top of bcrypt hashing (~100ms). The penalty grows with consecutive failures and resets after the rate-limit window expires. Concurrency protection caps the delay when multiple penalty tasks are already running for the same IP.
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- **Exponential backoff:** Each failed login attempt incurs a progressively longer delay before the next attempt is allowed:
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- 1st failure: 1 × 2¹ = 2 seconds
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- 2nd failure: 1 × 2² = 4 seconds
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- 3rd failure: 1 × 2³ = 8 seconds
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- 4th+ failures: capped at 10 seconds (max)
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- Failed attempts that arrive during the backoff period return **HTTP 429 Too Many Requests** with a `Retry-After` header indicating the remaining wait time.
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- Each failed login is also accompanied by bcrypt password hashing (~100ms), providing additional computational resistance.
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- The backoff counter resets after the rate-limit window (60 seconds by default) expires with no new failures.
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**IP Extraction (Proxy Safety):**
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- When behind nginx, the rate limiter reads the real client IP from `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers.
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@@ -1,42 +1,3 @@
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## [Backend] Exception handler overlap — broad handlers catching everything
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**Where found**
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- `backend/app/main.py:182-200` — `_get_error_code()` accepts any `Exception` and falls back to snake_case conversion
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- Multiple handlers (lines 329-466) accept `Exception` as parameter
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**Why this is needed**
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Broad exception handlers create fragility: adding a new `DomainError` subclass without explicitly registering a handler silently falls through, producing generic error codes instead of specific ones. The fallback chain is not explicitly documented.
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**Goal**
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Make the exception handler registration explicit and documented. Every exception type that can bubble up should have a clear path to a handler.
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**What to do**
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1. Audit all exception handlers and confirm they are registered with the most specific base class
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2. Add a comment block documenting the fallback chain
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3. Ensure every custom `DomainError` subclass has `error_code` and `get_error_metadata()` implemented
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4. Add a catch-all `Exception` handler as the absolute last resort
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**Possible traps and issues**
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- If a new `DomainError` subclass is added without handler registration, it silently returns wrong status code
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- `ValueError` handler may catch Pydantic `ValidationError` subclasses
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**Docs changes needed**
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- Update `Docs/Architekture.md` § 2.2 (Application Entry Point) — document exception handler hierarchy
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- Add section in `Docs/Backend-Development.md` on exception taxonomy
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**Doc references**
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- `Docs/Architekture.md` § 2.2 (Application Entry Point)
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- `Docs/Backend-Development.md` (exception conventions)
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---
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## [Backend] Login rate limiter — penalty sleep does not block the request
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**Where found**
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@@ -12,15 +12,14 @@ For programmatic API clients (non-browser), use ``POST /api/auth/token``
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which returns a token in the response body for use in the ``Authorization``
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header. This endpoint does not set a cookie.
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Login attempts are rate-limited to 5 per minute per IP address to prevent
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brute-force attacks. Requests exceeding the limit return ``429 Too Many Requests``
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with a ``Retry-After`` header.
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Rate limiting uses exponential backoff: each wrong password attempt incurs
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a progressive delay (0.5s, 1s, 2s, 4s, 5s max) per IP address. Requests
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blocked by this delay return ``429 Too Many Requests`` with a ``Retry-After``
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header.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import structlog
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Request, Response
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@@ -60,8 +59,9 @@ async def login(
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On success the token is also set as an ``HttpOnly`` ``SameSite=Lax``
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cookie so the browser SPA benefits from automatic credential handling.
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Rate limiting: Up to 5 login attempts per minute per client IP.
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Requests exceeding this limit return ``429 Too Many Requests`` with
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Rate limiting: Exponential backoff on failed attempts. Each wrong password
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incurs an increasing delay (0.5s, 1s, 2s, 4s, 5s max per IP address).
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Requests during the penalty period return ``429 Too Many Requests`` with
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a ``Retry-After`` header.
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Args:
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@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ async def login(
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"""
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client_ip = get_client_ip(request, trusted_proxies=settings.trusted_proxies)
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# Check if this IP is currently blocked by exponential backoff
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if not rate_limiter.is_allowed(client_ip):
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log.warning("login_rate_limit_exceeded", client_ip=client_ip)
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raise RateLimitError("Too many login attempts. Please try again later.")
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@@ -94,16 +95,9 @@ async def login(
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session_repo=session_ctx.session_repo,
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)
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except ValueError as exc:
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# Progressive penalty delay on wrong password to slow down brute-force
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# attacks without exhausting request capacity (app-layer DoS resistance).
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penalty = rate_limiter.record_failure(client_ip)
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acquired = rate_limiter.acquire(client_ip)
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try:
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if acquired:
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await asyncio.sleep(penalty)
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finally:
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rate_limiter.release(client_ip)
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log.warning("login_failed", client_ip=client_ip, error=str(exc), penalty=penalty)
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# Record this failure to increment the exponential backoff counter
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rate_limiter.record_failure(client_ip)
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log.warning("login_failed", client_ip=client_ip, error=str(exc))
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raise AuthenticationError(str(exc)) from exc
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response.set_cookie(
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@@ -1,26 +1,39 @@
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"""In-memory rate limiter for IP-based request throttling.
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Tracks login attempts per IP address and enforces a configurable limit.
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Uses a dictionary of deques (per IP) storing timestamps of recent attempts.
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Implements exponential backoff for failed login attempts using failure tracking.
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Each wrong password attempt increments the failure count for that IP, and subsequent
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attempts are blocked for a duration that grows exponentially up to a maximum.
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Uses a dictionary of deques (per IP) storing timestamps of recent failures.
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Old entries are cleaned up by a background task to prevent unbounded growth.
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Process-local implementation — in multi-worker setups, each worker has
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independent counters. This constraint limits the blast radius of brute-force
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attacks to a single worker.
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The penalty strategy for failed login attempts is also managed here:
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record_failure() records a failure timestamp and returns the penalty delay
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to apply, enabling progressive back-off without exhausting request capacity.
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**How It Works:**
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Operational Notes
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-----------------
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1. A successful login resets the failure counter for that IP.
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2. Each failed login (wrong password) calls record_failure() and increments the counter.
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3. is_allowed() checks if enough time has passed since the last failure based on
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the current failure count. The delay grows exponentially with each consecutive failure:
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**Cleanup Lifecycle**: The rate limiter state (_attempts, _failures, _lock_counts)
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grows as IPs interact with the system. To prevent unbounded memory growth during
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long runtimes, a scheduled background task (rate_limiter_cleanup) calls the
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cleanup_expired() method every 30 minutes. This is safe because:
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- 1st failure: 0.5 second penalty
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- 2nd failure: 1 second penalty (0.5 * 2^1)
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- 3rd failure: 2 seconds penalty (0.5 * 2^2)
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- 4th failure: 4 seconds penalty (0.5 * 2^3)
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- ... up to the configured maximum (default 5 seconds)
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- cleanup_expired() only removes IPs with no recent attempts (all timestamps
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4. Penalties are cumulative within the window: if an attacker makes 5 failed
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attempts, they must wait the full 5 seconds before trying again (not 5 seconds
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per attempt).
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**Cleanup Lifecycle**: The rate limiter state (_failures) grows as IPs interact
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with the system. To prevent unbounded memory growth during long runtimes, a
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scheduled background task (rate_limiter_cleanup) calls cleanup_expired() every
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30 minutes. This is safe because:
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- cleanup_expired() only removes IPs with no recent failures (all timestamps
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outside the rate-limit window), so active IPs are never disrupted.
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- The cleanup is non-blocking and logged for observability.
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- Individual requests already prune old timestamps from each IP's deque during
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@@ -70,48 +83,57 @@ class RateLimiter:
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Args:
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max_attempts: Maximum attempts allowed within the window.
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(Deprecated: now only used for cleanup window size)
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window_seconds: Time window (seconds) for rate limit.
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"""
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self.max_attempts: int = max_attempts
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self.window_seconds: int = window_seconds
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self._attempts: dict[str, deque[float]] = {}
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self._failures: dict[str, deque[float]] = {}
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self._lock_counts: dict[str, int] = {}
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def is_allowed(self, ip_address: str) -> bool:
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"""Check if a request from *ip_address* is allowed.
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If allowed, the current timestamp is recorded. Old entries (outside
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the window) are removed before checking.
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Checks if the IP has accumulated failures that would currently block
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the attempt due to penalty backoff. Does NOT record a new attempt —
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that happens only on successful password verification.
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Args:
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ip_address: The client IP address to rate-limit.
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Returns:
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``True`` if the request is allowed, ``False`` if the limit is exceeded.
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``True`` if the request is allowed (past penalty period), ``False``
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if currently blocked by exponential backoff.
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"""
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now = time()
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if ip_address not in self._failures:
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self._failures[ip_address] = deque()
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failures = self._failures[ip_address]
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cutoff = now - self.window_seconds
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if ip_address not in self._attempts:
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self._attempts[ip_address] = deque()
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# Remove old failures outside the window
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while failures and failures[0] < cutoff:
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failures.popleft()
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attempts = self._attempts[ip_address]
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# If no recent failures, request is allowed
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if not failures:
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return True
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# Remove old attempts outside the window
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while attempts and attempts[0] < cutoff:
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attempts.popleft()
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# Calculate accumulated penalty: how much time must pass before
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# the next attempt is allowed, based on failure count
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failure_count = len(failures)
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penalty = min(
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LOGIN_PENALTY_BASE_SECONDS * (LOGIN_PENALTY_MULTIPLIER ** failure_count),
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LOGIN_PENALTY_MAX_SECONDS,
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)
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# Check if the limit is exceeded
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if len(attempts) >= self.max_attempts:
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return False
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# Record this attempt
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attempts.append(now)
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return True
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# Check if enough time has passed since the last failure
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time_since_last_failure = now - failures[-1]
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return time_since_last_failure >= penalty
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def cleanup_expired(self) -> None:
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"""Remove all IPs with no recent attempts (cleanup task).
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"""Remove all IPs with no recent failures (cleanup task).
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Called periodically by the background task to prevent unbounded
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growth of the tracking dictionary.
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@@ -120,119 +142,67 @@ class RateLimiter:
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cutoff = now - self.window_seconds
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ips_to_remove = []
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for ip_address, attempts in self._attempts.items():
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# Remove old attempts
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while attempts and attempts[0] < cutoff:
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attempts.popleft()
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# Mark IP for removal if no attempts remain
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if not attempts:
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for ip_address, failures in self._failures.items():
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# Remove old failures
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while failures and failures[0] < cutoff:
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failures.popleft()
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# Mark IP for removal if no failures remain
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if not failures:
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ips_to_remove.append(ip_address)
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for ip_address in ips_to_remove:
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del self._attempts[ip_address]
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del self._failures[ip_address]
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if ips_to_remove:
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log.debug("rate_limiter_cleanup", removed_ips=len(ips_to_remove))
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def get_state(self) -> Mapping[str, int]:
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"""Return a read-only view of current attempt counts per IP.
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"""Return a read-only view of current failure counts per IP.
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For debugging and monitoring.
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Returns:
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A mapping of IP addresses to their attempt counts.
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A mapping of IP addresses to their failure counts.
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"""
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now = time()
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cutoff = now - self.window_seconds
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result = {}
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for ip_address, attempts in self._attempts.items():
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# Count non-expired attempts
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count = sum(1 for ts in attempts if ts >= cutoff)
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for ip_address, failures in self._failures.items():
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# Count non-expired failures
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count = sum(1 for ts in failures if ts >= cutoff)
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if count > 0:
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result[ip_address] = count
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return result
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def reset(self) -> None:
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"""Clear all tracked attempts (for testing)."""
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self._attempts.clear()
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"""Clear all tracked failures (for testing)."""
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self._failures.clear()
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self._lock_counts.clear()
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Penalty strategy for failed login attempts
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def record_failure(self, ip_address: str) -> float:
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"""Record a failed login attempt and return the penalty delay in seconds.
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def record_failure(self, ip_address: str) -> None:
|
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"""Record a failed login attempt.
|
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Tracks consecutive failures per IP. Penalty grows exponentially with
|
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each failure, bounded by :data:`~app.utils.constants.LOGIN_PENALTY_MAX_SECONDS`,
|
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then resets the failure counter. This provides brute-force resistance
|
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without exhausting request capacity.
|
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A concurrency guard (``_lock_counts``) prevents a single IP from
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accumulating many concurrent penalty tasks.
|
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Tracks failures per IP to enable exponential backoff in is_allowed().
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The penalty delay is automatically calculated in is_allowed() based on
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the failure count, providing transparent brute-force resistance.
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Args:
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ip_address: The client IP address whose login attempt failed.
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Returns:
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The penalty delay in seconds to apply.
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"""
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now = time()
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if ip_address not in self._failures:
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self._failures[ip_address] = deque()
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if ip_address not in self._lock_counts:
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self._lock_counts[ip_address] = 0
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failures = self._failures[ip_address]
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lock_count = self._lock_counts[ip_address]
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# Reset if last failure is outside the window
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cutoff = now - self.window_seconds
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# Remove old failures outside the window
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while failures and failures[0] < cutoff:
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failures.popleft()
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consecutive = len(failures)
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penalty = min(
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LOGIN_PENALTY_BASE_SECONDS * (LOGIN_PENALTY_MULTIPLIER ** consecutive),
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LOGIN_PENALTY_MAX_SECONDS,
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)
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# Record this failure
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failures.append(now)
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# Concurrency protection: if too many concurrent sleeps are already
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||||
# running for this IP, cap the penalty to avoid thread exhaustion.
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if lock_count >= 3:
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penalty = min(penalty, LOGIN_PENALTY_BASE_SECONDS)
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|
||||
return penalty
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||||
|
||||
def acquire(self, ip_address: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Acquire a concurrency slot for a penalty task.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
ip_address: The client IP address.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
``True`` if the slot was acquired, ``False`` if the IP already has
|
||||
the maximum number of concurrent penalty tasks running.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if ip_address not in self._lock_counts:
|
||||
self._lock_counts[ip_address] = 0
|
||||
|
||||
if self._lock_counts[ip_address] >= 3:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
self._lock_counts[ip_address] += 1
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
def release(self, ip_address: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Release a concurrency slot when a penalty task completes.
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
ip_address: The client IP address.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if ip_address in self._lock_counts and self._lock_counts[ip_address] > 0:
|
||||
self._lock_counts[ip_address] -= 1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
from collections.abc import Generator
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ async def _do_setup(client: AsyncClient) -> None:
|
||||
|
||||
async def _login(client: AsyncClient, password: str = "Mysecretpass1!") -> str:
|
||||
"""Helper: perform login and return the session token from the cookie.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Note: The token is returned in the HttpOnly cookie, not in the JSON body.
|
||||
For testing Bearer token auth, we extract it from the cookie.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
@@ -109,36 +110,43 @@ class TestLogin:
|
||||
async def test_login_rate_limit_returns_429_after_5_attempts(
|
||||
self, client: AsyncClient
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""Login returns 429 after 5 failed attempts within 60 seconds."""
|
||||
"""Login is blocked immediately after first failed attempt due to exponential backoff."""
|
||||
await _do_setup(client)
|
||||
limiter = client._transport.app.state.login_rate_limiter
|
||||
limiter.reset()
|
||||
|
||||
# Make 5 failed login attempts
|
||||
for i in range(5):
|
||||
response = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrongpassword"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 401, f"Expected 401 on attempt {i + 1}"
|
||||
|
||||
# 6th attempt should be rate-limited
|
||||
# First failed attempt is allowed
|
||||
response = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/auth/login", json={"password": "Hallo123!"}
|
||||
"/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrongpassword"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 401
|
||||
|
||||
# Second attempt immediately after is blocked by 1s penalty
|
||||
response = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrongpassword"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 429
|
||||
assert response.json()["detail"] == "Too many login attempts. Please try again later."
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify the failure count is correct
|
||||
state = limiter.get_state()
|
||||
assert "127.0.0.1" in state
|
||||
assert state["127.0.0.1"] >= 1
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_login_rate_limit_includes_retry_after_header(
|
||||
self, client: AsyncClient
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""Rate-limited response includes Retry-After header."""
|
||||
await _do_setup(client)
|
||||
limiter = client._transport.app.state.login_rate_limiter
|
||||
limiter.reset()
|
||||
|
||||
# Exceed rate limit
|
||||
for _ in range(5):
|
||||
await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
# First attempt fails
|
||||
response = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 401
|
||||
|
||||
response = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Second immediate attempt is rate-limited
|
||||
response = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 429
|
||||
assert "retry-after" in response.headers
|
||||
assert response.headers["retry-after"] == "60"
|
||||
@@ -148,30 +156,23 @@ class TestLogin:
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""Rate limit is tracked separately per IP address."""
|
||||
await _do_setup(client)
|
||||
limiter = client._transport.app.state.login_rate_limiter
|
||||
limiter.reset()
|
||||
|
||||
# Make 5 failed attempts with default IP
|
||||
for _ in range(5):
|
||||
await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
# Make 1 failed attempt with default IP
|
||||
response = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 401
|
||||
|
||||
# 6th attempt is blocked
|
||||
# 2nd attempt is blocked
|
||||
response = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/auth/login", json={"password": "correct"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 429
|
||||
|
||||
# Simulate request from different IP via X-Forwarded-For
|
||||
# (trusted proxy required to honor header, but we can test the logic)
|
||||
response_from_other_ip = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/auth/login",
|
||||
json={"password": "wrong"},
|
||||
headers={"X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.1"}, # Different IP
|
||||
)
|
||||
# This should succeed (not rate-limited) because it's a different IP
|
||||
# However, without a trusted proxy configured, the X-Forwarded-For is ignored
|
||||
# So this will still use the client's actual IP and be rate-limited
|
||||
# We can still verify the rate limiter state to confirm the design
|
||||
limiter = client._transport.app.state.login_rate_limiter
|
||||
assert "127.0.0.1" in limiter.get_state()
|
||||
# Verify the failure count is correct
|
||||
state = limiter.get_state()
|
||||
assert "127.0.0.1" in state
|
||||
assert state["127.0.0.1"] >= 1
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_login_rate_limit_reset_after_window(
|
||||
self, client: AsyncClient
|
||||
@@ -181,20 +182,17 @@ class TestLogin:
|
||||
limiter = client._transport.app.state.login_rate_limiter
|
||||
limiter.reset()
|
||||
|
||||
# Make 5 failed attempts
|
||||
for _ in range(5):
|
||||
await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
# Make 1 failed attempt (enough to trigger exponential backoff)
|
||||
response = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 401
|
||||
|
||||
# 2nd attempt is blocked
|
||||
response = await client.post(
|
||||
"/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 429
|
||||
|
||||
# Manually advance time by clearing old attempts
|
||||
# In real scenario, this happens naturally as time passes
|
||||
limiter.cleanup_expired()
|
||||
|
||||
# Simulate the full window expiring by resetting
|
||||
# Reset the limiter (simulate window expiry)
|
||||
limiter.reset()
|
||||
|
||||
# Now a fresh login attempt should succeed (use correct password)
|
||||
@@ -203,6 +201,34 @@ class TestLogin:
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 200
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_login_exponential_backoff(self, client: AsyncClient) -> None:
|
||||
"""Exponential backoff accumulates with each consecutive failure."""
|
||||
await _do_setup(client)
|
||||
limiter = client._transport.app.state.login_rate_limiter
|
||||
limiter.reset()
|
||||
|
||||
# 1st failure: 1 * 2^1 = 2s penalty
|
||||
response = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 401
|
||||
state = limiter.get_state()
|
||||
assert state["127.0.0.1"] == 1
|
||||
|
||||
# 2nd attempt blocked immediately by 2s penalty
|
||||
response = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 429
|
||||
|
||||
# After 2.1s, the penalty expires and we can try again
|
||||
# (this will record a 2nd failure, creating a 1 * 2^2 = 4s penalty)
|
||||
await asyncio.sleep(2.1)
|
||||
response = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 401
|
||||
state = limiter.get_state()
|
||||
assert state["127.0.0.1"] == 2
|
||||
|
||||
# Now blocked by 4s penalty
|
||||
response = await client.post("/api/auth/login", json={"password": "wrong"})
|
||||
assert response.status_code == 429
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Logout
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user