Commit Graph

12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
277f2a467c Refactor rate limiting with exponential backoff strategy
- Update rate limiter to use exponential backoff instead of fixed limit
- Implement progressive delays for failed login attempts (0.5s, 1s, 2s, 4s, 5s max)
- Update auth router documentation and endpoint docs
- Refactor test suite to match new rate limiting behavior
- Update backend development documentation
- Clean up unused tasks documentation

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-30 19:58:09 +02:00
93021500c3 TASK-033: Remove session token from JSON response body
Fixes a critical security vulnerability where the session token was
being returned in the JSON response body of POST /api/auth/login.
This exposed the token to JavaScript, allowing malicious scripts to
steal it and bypass the HttpOnly cookie protection.

Changes:
- Backend: Remove 'token' field from LoginResponse model (auth.py)
- Backend: Update login() endpoint to return only 'expires_at'
- Frontend: Update LoginResponse type to exclude 'token' field
- Backend: Update test helper _login() to extract token from cookie
- Backend: Update test cases to verify token is NOT in response body
- Documentation: Add section 'Authentication Endpoints' in Backend-Development.md
- Documentation: Update Web-Development.md to explain HttpOnly cookie benefits

Security benefit: Session tokens are now only accessible via HttpOnly
cookies, protected from JavaScript access, XSS attacks, and malicious
third-party scripts. The frontend continues to use only the cookie for
authentication.

All auth tests pass (23 tests). Type checking and linting pass with
zero errors.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-26 19:38:33 +02:00
ea4c7c2f85 Implement login endpoint rate limiting (TASK-007)
- Add in-memory rate limiter with per-IP deque tracking of attempt timestamps
- Limit login attempts to 5 per 60 seconds per IP, return 429 on excess
- Add Retry-After header to rate limit responses
- Implement IP extraction utility with proxy trust validation (prevent X-Forwarded-For spoofing)
- Integrate rate limiter into auth router and dependencies
- Add 10-second asyncio.sleep on failed login attempts to further slow brute-force
- Add comprehensive tests for rate limiting (9 new tests, all passing)
- Update Features.md to document login rate limiting
- Update Backend-Development.md with rate limiting conventions and design patterns
- Fix test infrastructure issues: update password to meet complexity requirements
- Fix TestValidateSession tests to use Bearer token authentication
- All tests passing: 23 auth tests + full test suite coverage

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-26 12:40:52 +02:00
29daaa9906 TASK-004: Bootstrap frontend auth state from backend session check
Validates session on app mount by calling GET /api/auth/session instead of relying
solely on cached sessionStorage. This ensures the UI state always reflects server
reality — expired or revoked sessions are detected immediately.

Changes:
- Backend: Add GET /api/auth/session endpoint (requires valid session, returns 200/401)
- Frontend: Add useSessionValidation hook for mount-time validation
- Frontend: Add SessionValidationLoading component for validation spinner
- Frontend: Update AuthProvider to call validation on mount with loading state
- Frontend: Add validateSession API function
- Docs: Update Features.md with session validation behavior
- Docs: Update Web-Development.md with session validation pattern

Handles three outcomes:
1. Valid session (200): Proceed with cached state
2. Invalid session (401): Clear sessionStorage and redirect to login
3. Network error: Don't logout (backend may be temporarily unreachable)

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-26 12:00:21 +02:00
0e5e08374f Use shared SESSION_COOKIE_NAME in auth router tests 2026-04-14 10:33:32 +02:00
1dfc17f4f5 Replace process-local session cache with pluggable session cache backend 2026-04-10 19:22:02 +02:00
e1d741956e Disable session cache by default and make it opt-in for single-process deployments 2026-04-09 21:52:57 +02:00
4043cdfa3c Harden session cookie security with configurable cookie flags 2026-04-09 21:43:32 +02:00
208f98dc97 Use session_secret for signed auth session tokens 2026-04-09 21:30:08 +02:00
1c0bac1353 refactor: improve backend type safety and import organization
- Add TYPE_CHECKING guards for runtime-expensive imports (aiohttp, aiosqlite)
- Reorganize imports to follow PEP 8 conventions
- Convert TypeAlias to modern PEP 695 type syntax (where appropriate)
- Use Sequence/Mapping from collections.abc for type hints (covariant)
- Replace string literals with cast() for improved type inference
- Fix casting of Fail2BanResponse and TypedDict patterns
- Add IpLookupResult TypedDict for precise return type annotation
- Reformat overlong lines for readability (120 char limit)
- Add asyncio_mode and filterwarnings to pytest config
- Update test fixtures with improved type hints

This improves mypy type checking and makes type relationships explicit.
2026-03-22 14:24:24 +01:00
d931e8c6a3 Reduce per-request DB overhead (Task 4)
- Cache setup_completed flag in app.state._setup_complete_cached after
  first successful is_setup_complete() call; all subsequent API requests
  skip the DB query entirely (one-way transition, cleared on restart).
- Add in-memory session token TTL cache (10 s) in require_auth; the second
  request with the same token within the window skips session_repo.get_session.
- Call invalidate_session_cache() on logout so revoked tokens are evicted
  immediately rather than waiting for TTL expiry.
- Add clear_session_cache() for test isolation.
- 5 new tests covering the cached fast-path for both optimisations.
- 460 tests pass, 83% coverage, zero ruff/mypy warnings.
2026-03-10 19:16:00 +01:00
750785680b feat: Stage 2 — authentication and setup flow
Backend (tasks 2.1–2.6, 2.10):
- settings_repo: get/set/delete/get_all CRUD for the key-value settings table
- session_repo: create/get/delete/delete_expired for session rows
- setup_service: bcrypt password hashing, one-time-only enforcement,
  run_setup() / is_setup_complete() / get_password_hash()
- auth_service: login() with bcrypt verify + token creation,
  validate_session() with expiry check, logout()
- setup router: GET /api/setup (status), POST /api/setup (201 / 409)
- auth router: POST /api/auth/login (token + HttpOnly cookie),
               POST /api/auth/logout (clears cookie, idempotent)
- SetupRedirectMiddleware: 307 → /api/setup for all API paths until setup done
- require_auth dependency: cookie or Bearer token → Session or 401
- conftest.py: manually bootstraps app.state.db for router tests
  (ASGITransport does not trigger ASGI lifespan)
- 85 tests pass; ruff 0 errors; mypy --strict 0 errors

Frontend (tasks 2.7–2.9):
- types/auth.ts, types/setup.ts, api/auth.ts, api/setup.ts
- AuthProvider: sessionStorage-backed context (isAuthenticated, login, logout)
- RequireAuth: guard component → /login?next=<path> when unauthenticated
- SetupPage: Fluent UI form, client-side validation, inline errors
- LoginPage: single password input, ?next= redirect after success
- DashboardPage: placeholder (full impl Stage 5)
- App.tsx: full route tree (/setup, /login, /, *)
2026-02-28 21:33:30 +01:00