Commit Graph

15 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
9072117db3 ## 28) Login failure delay can enable app-layer DoS 2026-04-29 19:02:00 +02:00
1e2576af2a ## 27) Error response body shape is inconsistent 2026-04-28 22:28:02 +02:00
507f153ab9 Enforce repository boundary: Remove DbDep from routers
This commit enforces the repository boundary by eliminating direct database connection
dependencies (DbDep) from all routers. Routers now depend on service context dependencies
that combine the database connection with the related repositories.

Changes:
- Add 5 service context dependencies in dependencies.py:
  * SessionServiceContext: db + session_repo
  * BlocklistServiceContext: db + blocklist_repo + import_log_repo + settings_repo
  * SettingsServiceContext: db + settings_repo
  * BanServiceContext: db + fail2ban_db_repo
  * HistoryServiceContext: db + fail2ban_db_repo + history_archive_repo

- Refactor all 9 routers (auth, bans, blocklist, config_misc, dashboard, geo,
  history, jails, setup) to use service contexts instead of DbDep.

- Update Backend-Development.md with clear examples of the new pattern and
  documentation of available service contexts.

Rationale:
- Enforces the repository boundary through the dependency system
- Makes database operations explicit and auditable
- Improves testability by allowing service contexts to be mocked
- Prevents accidental direct database access from routers

The deprecated DbDep remains available for backward compatibility with
services that have not yet been refactored, but routers can no longer import it.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-28 07:35:23 +02:00
93021500c3 TASK-033: Remove session token from JSON response body
Fixes a critical security vulnerability where the session token was
being returned in the JSON response body of POST /api/auth/login.
This exposed the token to JavaScript, allowing malicious scripts to
steal it and bypass the HttpOnly cookie protection.

Changes:
- Backend: Remove 'token' field from LoginResponse model (auth.py)
- Backend: Update login() endpoint to return only 'expires_at'
- Frontend: Update LoginResponse type to exclude 'token' field
- Backend: Update test helper _login() to extract token from cookie
- Backend: Update test cases to verify token is NOT in response body
- Documentation: Add section 'Authentication Endpoints' in Backend-Development.md
- Documentation: Update Web-Development.md to explain HttpOnly cookie benefits

Security benefit: Session tokens are now only accessible via HttpOnly
cookies, protected from JavaScript access, XSS attacks, and malicious
third-party scripts. The frontend continues to use only the cookie for
authentication.

All auth tests pass (23 tests). Type checking and linting pass with
zero errors.

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-26 19:38:33 +02:00
ea4c7c2f85 Implement login endpoint rate limiting (TASK-007)
- Add in-memory rate limiter with per-IP deque tracking of attempt timestamps
- Limit login attempts to 5 per 60 seconds per IP, return 429 on excess
- Add Retry-After header to rate limit responses
- Implement IP extraction utility with proxy trust validation (prevent X-Forwarded-For spoofing)
- Integrate rate limiter into auth router and dependencies
- Add 10-second asyncio.sleep on failed login attempts to further slow brute-force
- Add comprehensive tests for rate limiting (9 new tests, all passing)
- Update Features.md to document login rate limiting
- Update Backend-Development.md with rate limiting conventions and design patterns
- Fix test infrastructure issues: update password to meet complexity requirements
- Fix TestValidateSession tests to use Bearer token authentication
- All tests passing: 23 auth tests + full test suite coverage

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-26 12:40:52 +02:00
29daaa9906 TASK-004: Bootstrap frontend auth state from backend session check
Validates session on app mount by calling GET /api/auth/session instead of relying
solely on cached sessionStorage. This ensures the UI state always reflects server
reality — expired or revoked sessions are detected immediately.

Changes:
- Backend: Add GET /api/auth/session endpoint (requires valid session, returns 200/401)
- Frontend: Add useSessionValidation hook for mount-time validation
- Frontend: Add SessionValidationLoading component for validation spinner
- Frontend: Update AuthProvider to call validation on mount with loading state
- Frontend: Add validateSession API function
- Docs: Update Features.md with session validation behavior
- Docs: Update Web-Development.md with session validation pattern

Handles three outcomes:
1. Valid session (200): Proceed with cached state
2. Invalid session (401): Clear sessionStorage and redirect to login
3. Network error: Don't logout (backend may be temporarily unreachable)

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-26 12:00:21 +02:00
6e1e3c4546 Remove unused service protocol aliases and use direct service imports 2026-04-17 16:01:27 +02:00
58112fb191 Move auth session signing into auth_service.login 2026-04-17 15:33:09 +02:00
a564830abb Fix blocklist service injection and centralize session cookie name 2026-04-14 09:21:38 +02:00
3371ff8324 Introduce service/repository dependency protocols and tests 2026-04-10 19:51:19 +02:00
1dfc17f4f5 Replace process-local session cache with pluggable session cache backend 2026-04-10 19:22:02 +02:00
4043cdfa3c Harden session cookie security with configurable cookie flags 2026-04-09 21:43:32 +02:00
208f98dc97 Use session_secret for signed auth session tokens 2026-04-09 21:30:08 +02:00
d931e8c6a3 Reduce per-request DB overhead (Task 4)
- Cache setup_completed flag in app.state._setup_complete_cached after
  first successful is_setup_complete() call; all subsequent API requests
  skip the DB query entirely (one-way transition, cleared on restart).
- Add in-memory session token TTL cache (10 s) in require_auth; the second
  request with the same token within the window skips session_repo.get_session.
- Call invalidate_session_cache() on logout so revoked tokens are evicted
  immediately rather than waiting for TTL expiry.
- Add clear_session_cache() for test isolation.
- 5 new tests covering the cached fast-path for both optimisations.
- 460 tests pass, 83% coverage, zero ruff/mypy warnings.
2026-03-10 19:16:00 +01:00
750785680b feat: Stage 2 — authentication and setup flow
Backend (tasks 2.1–2.6, 2.10):
- settings_repo: get/set/delete/get_all CRUD for the key-value settings table
- session_repo: create/get/delete/delete_expired for session rows
- setup_service: bcrypt password hashing, one-time-only enforcement,
  run_setup() / is_setup_complete() / get_password_hash()
- auth_service: login() with bcrypt verify + token creation,
  validate_session() with expiry check, logout()
- setup router: GET /api/setup (status), POST /api/setup (201 / 409)
- auth router: POST /api/auth/login (token + HttpOnly cookie),
               POST /api/auth/logout (clears cookie, idempotent)
- SetupRedirectMiddleware: 307 → /api/setup for all API paths until setup done
- require_auth dependency: cookie or Bearer token → Session or 401
- conftest.py: manually bootstraps app.state.db for router tests
  (ASGITransport does not trigger ASGI lifespan)
- 85 tests pass; ruff 0 errors; mypy --strict 0 errors

Frontend (tasks 2.7–2.9):
- types/auth.ts, types/setup.ts, api/auth.ts, api/setup.ts
- AuthProvider: sessionStorage-backed context (isAuthenticated, login, logout)
- RequireAuth: guard component → /login?next=<path> when unauthenticated
- SetupPage: Fluent UI form, client-side validation, inline errors
- LoginPage: single password input, ?next= redirect after success
- DashboardPage: placeholder (full impl Stage 5)
- App.tsx: full route tree (/setup, /login, /, *)
2026-02-28 21:33:30 +01:00