## Problem
The blocklist URL validation at create/update time has a TOCTOU (time-of-check-to-time-of-use) window.
An attacker can perform a DNS-rebinding attack where:
1. User adds blocklist URL pointing to attacker.com
2. At create time, attacker.com resolves to a public IP → validation passes
3. Later, when fetching, attacker.com resolves to 192.168.1.1 (internal network)
4. HTTP client connects to the private IP, potentially accessing internal services
## Solution
Add runtime destination IP validation at connection time via a custom socket factory:
- Created 'dns_validated_connector.py' with create_dns_validated_socket_factory() that validates
all resolved IPs before socket creation
- HTTP session now uses the validated socket factory, protecting all blocklist imports globally
- Rejects connections to RFC 1918 private ranges, loopback, link-local, ULA, multicast, and
reserved addresses (IPv4 and IPv6)
- Added comprehensive test coverage with 13 test cases
## Changes
- backend/app/services/dns_validated_connector.py: Custom socket factory with IP validation
- backend/app/startup.py: Use DNS-validated socket factory in HTTP session creation
- backend/app/utils/ip_utils.py: Updated docstring explaining runtime validation
- backend/app/services/blocklist_downloader.py: Updated module docstring
- backend/app/services/blocklist_service.py: Updated docstrings explaining two-layer protection
- backend/tests/test_services/test_dns_validated_connector.py: Test suite for socket factory
- Docs/Architekture.md: Added detailed section on DNS-rebinding protection
## Testing
- All 13 DNS validation tests pass
- All blocklist downloader tests pass (unaffected by changes)
- Linting: ruff, mypy pass with --strict
- Test coverage: 90% line coverage on dns_validated_connector.py
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Lukas
cc4370c50d